GR L 25502; (February, 1966) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-25502; February 28, 1966
LEOPOLDO DIAZ, petitioner, vs. HON. SALVADOR C. REYES, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS
During the canvass of votes for Congressman of the First District of Nueva Ecija, the provincial board of canvassers noted discrepancies in the election returns for two precincts in the Municipality of Quezon. For Precinct No. 13, the provincial treasurer’s copy showed candidate Leopoldo D. Diaz received 20 votes, while the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) copy showed 29 in words and 20 in figures. For Precinct No. 14, the provincial treasurer’s copy showed Diaz received 7 votes, while the COMELEC copy showed 17. Diaz secured a suspension of the canvass and filed a petition for judicial recount under Section 163 of the Revised Election Code, alleging the vote difference would materially alter the election result. Candidate Eugenio Baltao opposed, claiming the COMELEC copies were falsified or tampered with (e.g., the “nine” in “twenty-nine” and the “teen” in “seventeen” were intercalations). The Court of First Instance initially set a date for recount but, upon Baltao’s motion for reconsideration, reversed itself and ordered the case reopened to receive evidence on the alleged tampering/falsification. Diaz moved for reconsideration, arguing that under Section 163, the court’s function is merely to recount ballots. After denial of his motion, Diaz filed this petition to restrain the respondent court from receiving evidence on tampering and to compel it to proceed with the judicial recount.
ISSUE
In a judicial recount proceeding under Section 163 of the Revised Election Code, when a discrepancy exists between copies of an election return (e.g., provincial treasurer’s copy vs. COMELEC copy) and it is alleged that one copy is falsified or tampered with, may the court receive evidence on that allegation before proceeding to recount the ballots?
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the respondent court may receive evidence on the allegation of tampering or falsification before conducting a recount. Section 163 authorizes a recount only when “authentic copies” of election statements are contradictory. If the copy containing the discrepancy is not authentic—because it is tampered with or falsified—there is no valid basis for a recount, as the claimed discrepancy becomes a nullity. Therefore, presenting evidence on authenticity is necessary and imperative before a recount can proceed. The Court rejected Diaz’s concern that this would delay proclamation, noting that the proceeding is summary in nature and should be expedited. The ruling aligns with Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bansud, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. (G.R. No. L-18469, August 31, 1962), where a recount was deemed futile due to a falsified return. The petition was denied, and the restraining order lifted.
