G.R. No. L-25853 July 30, 1966
PABLO FESTEJO, petitioner, vs. CARMEN P. CRISOLOGO, as Governor of Ilocos Sur, THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF ILOCOS SUR and BRIGIDO VILOG, as Vice-Mayor of Sta. Lucia, Ilocos Sur, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Pablo Festejo is the municipal mayor of Sta. Lucia, Ilocos Sur. On January 14, 1966, he received a communication from respondent Governor Carmen P. Crisologo suspending him effective January 17, 1966, based on an administrative complaint. On February 7, 1966, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-25566 issued an order restraining the enforcement of this suspension. Subsequently, on March 14, 1966, petitioner received another communication from respondent Governor suspending him effective March 5, 1966, based on a new administrative complaint. This second complaint charged him with neglect of duty, corruption, dishonesty, and grave abuse of authority, specifically alleging that on June 29, 1965, he unlawfully withdrew and misappropriated P5,000.00 from the municipal treasury of Sta. Lucia. Petitioner filed the present action for prohibition with preliminary injunction, arguing that the second complaint was a means to circumvent the restraining order in the earlier case and that, since the allegations constituted a crime, no administrative action could be taken until after a final judgment of conviction.

ISSUE

Whether a municipal official charged with acts constituting both an administrative offense (neglect of duty, corruption, dishonesty, grave abuse of authority) and a crime involving moral turpitude (estafa/misappropriation) can be subject to administrative suspension prior to a final judgment of conviction for the crime.

RULING

The petition is dismissed. The Supreme Court held that under Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, a Provincial Governor may suspend a municipal officer if the charge, in the Governor’s opinion, affects the official integrity of the officer. The grounds for suspension fall into two categories: (1) those related to the discharge of official functions (neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other maladministration); and (2) commission of any crime involving moral turpitude. A final conviction is a prerequisite for administrative action only for crimes in the second category that are not linked to the performance of official duties. However, when the act or omission constitutes “neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office,” it is necessarily connected with the office and may be the subject of administrative action immediately, even if it also constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case, the charge of misappropriating public funds is intrinsically connected to the petitioner’s official duties and directly affects his official integrity. Therefore, respondent Governor acted within legal authority in issuing the preventive suspension order based on the administrative complaint, and no prior final conviction was required.