G.R. No. L-25887 July 26, 1966
BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC. and HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC. and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. (the Central) filed a complaint against respondent Capitol Subdivision, Inc. (the Subdivision) to establish a legal easement of right of way over the Subdivision’s property, Hacienda Mandalagan. The Central alleged that under a milling contract dated August 30, 1920, the original owners of the Hacienda granted it a gratuitous right of way for railways, canals, water pipes, and telephone lines for a period of 45 years, expiring at the end of the crop year 1964-1965 (specifically on September 30, 1965). Pursuant to this contract, the Central built a railroad line over the Hacienda. After the contract expired, the Subdivision demanded the removal of the railroad tracks and threatened to close the right of way. The Central filed suit, claiming that without this right of way, its mill operation would be completely paralyzed, and prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the Subdivision from interfering. The Court of First Instance, presided by respondent Judge Jose F. Fernandez, issued the preliminary injunction on October 13, 1965. The Subdivision filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which, in a resolution dated March 18, 1966, set aside the lower court’s injunction and issued its own writ enjoining the Central from using the railway upon the Subdivision’s posting of a P50,000 bond. The Central then petitioned the Supreme Court to annul the Court of Appeals’ resolution.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of the Central.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of First Instance did commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. The petition of the Central was dismissed, the Supreme Court’s preliminary injunction was lifted, and the injunction issued by the Court of Appeals was restored.
The Court held that for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must show a clear right to the relief demanded. The Central’s contractual right of way had expired on September 30, 1965. To be entitled to a compulsory legal easement under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, the Central must first establish the existence of four requisites: (1) that its property is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that it pays proper indemnity; (3) that the isolation was not due to its own acts; and (4) that the right of way is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, where consistent, the shortest distance to a public highway. The Central’s complaint contained no specific averments, and the lower court’s orders contained no findings, that these prerequisites existed. The mere expression of willingness to pay reasonable compensation was insufficient and did not constitute the prepayment required by law. Since the Central failed to show a clear, existing right to the easement at the time the injunction was issued, the writ was improperly granted. An injunction cannot be issued to protect a contingent or future right, or to enforce a supposed right not in esse. The function of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo, which at the time of issuance was that the Central’s contractual right had already expired. The Court also noted the Central’s laches in not taking seasonable steps to secure the right of way before the contract expired. The resolution of the Court of Appeals did not anticipate the merits of the case but correctly pointed out the fatal defect in the issuance of the preliminary injunction.