G.R. No. L-18726; August 31, 1966
THOMAS M. GONZALEZ, plaintiff and appellant, vs. DEMETRIO B. ENCARNACION and VENANCIO H. AQUINO, defendants and appellees.

FACTS

On September 6, 1960, Thomas M. Gonzalez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan to recover moral and exemplary damages from Demetrio B. Encarnacion. The damages were allegedly sustained due to Encarnacion filing a pleading titled “Reply and Answer to Counterclaim” in Civil Case No. N-151 before the Court of First Instance of Cavite, which contained words Gonzalez claimed were libelous, derogatory, and scurrilous to his personal worth, integrity, honor, and reputation. The complaint was later amended to include Venancio H. Aquino, Encarnacion’s counsel, as a co-defendant. Encarnacion and Aquino filed motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it stated no cause of action and that venue was improperly laid. The trial court initially denied Encarnacion’s motion but later reversed itself, dismissing the complaint in its orders dated January 25, 1961, and March 20, 1961. The trial court held that under Republic Act 1289 (amending Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code), the court where the civil action for damages was first filed (Cavite, where Civil Case N-151 was pending) acquired exclusive jurisdiction. The court further reasoned that the claim for damages should have been filed as a counterclaim in the existing Cavite case to avoid multiplicity of suits, citing Inciong v. Tolentino. Gonzalez appealed the dismissal.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance of Cagayan improperly dismissed Gonzalez’s complaint for damages based on improper venue, pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 1289.

RULING

The Supreme Court set aside the orders of dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court held that the venue was properly laid in Cagayan. Interpreting Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the Court ruled that it establishes a general rule: a civil action for damages in cases of written defamation “shall” be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where any of the accused or any of the offended parties resides. An exception exists when the libel is published, circulated, displayed, or exhibited in a province or city where neither the offender nor the offended party resides; in such a case, the action “may” be brought there. The use of the permissive “may” in the exception, contrasted with the mandatory “shall” in the general rule, indicates the exception is for the benefit of the offended party, who may choose to file suit where the libel was published to avoid giving additional publicity in his place of residence. The provision granting exclusive jurisdiction to the court where the action is “first filed” applies only to prevent the filing of another action in a different court under the same provision after one has already been instituted; it does not mandate that a claim for damages arising from a pleading filed in an existing case must be asserted as a counterclaim in that very case. The Court found the case of Dizon v. Encarnacion controlling, as it presented essentially similar facts and upheld the plaintiff’s choice of venue in his own residence. The case of Inciong v. Tolentino was distinguished, as it involved different facts and the dismissal there was ultimately based on prescription, not venue.