G.R. No. 234999, August 04, 2021
Heirs of Bartolome J. Sanchez, Represented by Edna N. Vda. De Sanchez, Petitioners, vs. Heldelita, Allen, Alberto, Arthur, Maria Anita, All Surnamed Abrantes, Respondents.

FACTS

Horacio C. Abrantes filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Confirmation of Absolute Sale, Reconveyance, Liquidation, Damages, and Attorney’s Fees (First Complaint) against the heirs of Bartolome J. Sanchez, Jr. (petitioners) concerning a disputed property. After Horacio died, his counsel, Atty. Patrick Battad, moved to dismiss the First Complaint on the ground that Horacio’s heirs were no longer interested in pursuing the case. The RTC Branch 5 granted the motion and dismissed the case in an Order dated August 13, 2004 (First Dismissal Order), which became final and executory. More than four years after Horacio’s death, his heirs (respondents) filed a new Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Sale, Reconveyance, and Damages (Second Complaint) against the same petitioners over the same property before RTC Branch 3. The RTC Branch 3 dismissed the Second Complaint on the ground of res judicata, citing the First Dismissal Order as an adjudication on the merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal but on the ground of litis pendentia, ruling that the First Dismissal Order was a patent nullity due to lack of proper substitution of parties after Horacio’s death, thus the First Complaint was deemed still pending.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in ruling that the First Dismissal Order was a nullity.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the Second Complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.

RULING

1. The First Dismissal Order is valid and final. The rule on substitution of parties in case of death is a requirement of due process, not jurisdiction. Any violation of this rule, which could render a proceeding void, is a personal right that can only be invoked by the heirs whose due process was violated. The respondents never assailed the First Dismissal Order; instead, they retained the same counsel and filed the Second Complaint. This inaction and subsequent conduct constituted an implied ratification of the counsel’s actions and the dismissal order. Therefore, the First Dismissal Order is valid and had become final and executory.
2. The Second Complaint is barred by res judicata, not litis pendentia. Litis pendentia requires that another action be pending between the same parties for the same cause. Since the First Dismissal Order was a final disposition, there was no pending first action to speak of. The elements of res judicata are present: (a) the First Dismissal Order is final; (b) it was rendered by a court with jurisdiction; (c) it is a judgment on the merits; and (d) there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the two complaints. The First Dismissal Order was an adjudication on the merits. Although the dismissal was initiated by the plaintiff’s counsel via a motion, and not strictly under Section 3, Rule 17 (dismissal due to fault of plaintiff), the trial court’s order did not specify it was “without prejudice.” Following Section 2, Rule 17, a dismissal upon motion of the plaintiff is generally without prejudice only if the order so specifies. The First Dismissal Order did not contain such specification; it was a simple grant of the motion to dismiss. Consequently, the dismissal operated as an adjudication upon the merits, barring the Second Complaint under the doctrine of res judicata. The CA’s dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia was therefore erroneous.