G.R. No. 164170 ; April 16, 2009
MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA y ABDUL, ISAGANI ABDUL y SIACOR, and SARAH LANGCO y ANGLI, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, P/C INSP. MICHAEL ANGELO BERNARDO MARTIN, P/INSP. ALLANJING ESTRADA MEDINA, PO3 ARNOLD RAMOS ASIS, PO2 PEDRO SANTOS GUTIERREZ, PO2 IGNACIO DE PAZ, and PO2 ANTONIO SEBASTIAN BERIDA, JR., Respondents.

FACTS

On September 18, 2001, petitioners Maca-Angcos Alawiya, Isagani Abdul, and Sarah Langco executed sworn statements before the Western Police District charging several police officers with Kidnapping for Ransom. They alleged that on September 11, 2001, their vehicle was bumped by a Toyota Sedan on United Nations Avenue, Manila. Armed men alighted, blindfolded them, and took them to an office where a ransom of ₱10,000,000 (later reduced to ₱700,000 plus two vehicles) was demanded for their release, which was delivered, leading to their release on September 12, 2001. After investigation, State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco recommended the filing of an Information for Kidnapping for Ransom, which was approved and filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, on January 24, 2002 (Criminal Case No. 02198832). The trial court issued a Warrant of Arrest and a Hold Departure Order.
The accused policemen filed a petition for review with the Office of the Secretary of Justice and moved to quash the Information in the trial court, arguing that the officer who filed it had no authority. The trial court denied the motion to quash. On September 24, 2002, then Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez reversed State Prosecutor Velasco’s resolution, ordering the withdrawal of the Information, finding the incident was a bungled buy-bust operation and that prior approval from the Office of the Ombudsman was required. This was affirmed by Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed, prompting this petition.

ISSUE

1. Whether prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman is required for the investigation and prosecution of the case against the accused policemen.
2. Whether the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of the State Prosecutor’s resolution amounted to an “executive acquittal.”
3. Whether the accused policemen can seek relief (via a motion to quash) from the trial court when they had not been arrested yet.
4. Whether there was probable cause against the accused for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

RULING

1. On the requirement of prior Ombudsman approval: The Supreme Court ruled that prior approval by the Ombudsman is not required. Citing Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the Court held that the Ombudsman’s power to investigate offenses involving public officers is concurrent with other authorized agencies like state prosecutors. Therefore, the Court of Appeals and the Secretary of Justice erred in ruling that prior Ombudsman approval was necessary.
2. On the reversal by the Secretary of Justice: The Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice retains the power to review resolutions of subordinates even after an information is filed in court, as established in Marcelo v. Court of Appeals and Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals. This reversal does not constitute an “executive acquittal”; it is an exercise of the Secretary’s power of control and supervision. However, once the information is filed, the court has primary discretion over the case’s disposition, and the trial judge is not bound by the Secretary’s reversal.
3. On the accused seeking relief before arrest: The Court ruled that the accused can seek relief from the trial court via a motion to quash even if they have not been arrested. Citing Miranda v. Tuliao, the Court held that by filing a motion to quash on grounds such as lack of authority of the filing officer, the accused submits to the court’s jurisdiction. The trial court thus had jurisdiction to rule on the motion to quash.
4. On the existence of probable cause: The Court found that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the State Prosecutor’s finding of probable cause for kidnapping for ransom. The Secretary’s finding that the incident was a bungled buy-bust operation was based on a reevaluation of evidence, including a Sinumpaang Salaysay from Cesar Landayan (a taxi driver apprehended with petitioners) stating they were released on the same day, contrary to petitioners’ claim. The Supreme Court held that in a petition for certiorari, the inquiry is limited to whether the Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The determination of probable cause is an executive function, and courts generally do not interfere unless there is a clear case of abuse. Here, the Secretary’s finding was based on a different appreciation of evidence, which does not necessarily constitute grave abuse of discretion warranting judicial reversal.