GR 19460; (December, 1966) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-19460 December 28, 1966
ROQUE BAIRAN, petitioner, vs. AGUSTIN TAN SIU LAY, FRANCISCO TAN, executor and HON. ANTONIO CAÑIZARES, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
FACTS
On October 22, 1954, respondent Francisco Tan, as attorney-in-fact for his father Tan Chiong Pun, appointed petitioner Roque Bairan as substitute attorney-in-fact to administer, supervise, control, and sell on installment the “Mabuhay Subdivision.” After Tan Chiong Pun died on November 25, 1956, testate proceedings were instituted, and Francisco Tan was appointed executor. On March 15, 1960, heir Agustin Tan Siu Lay petitioned the probate court to require Bairan to post a P250,000 bond, alleging Bairan had retained unauthorized deductions from collections and that substantial estate funds were in his hands. The respondent judge issued an order on January 4, 1961, requiring Bairan to post a P100,000 surety bond. Bairan’s motion for reconsideration was denied on February 9, 1961. Bairan attempted to appeal this order, but the judge ruled it was interlocutory and unappealable on June 8, 1961. Subsequently, on June 17, 1961, the judge ordered Bairan to surrender and deliver possession of all estate properties in his hands to the executor, due to his failure to file the bond and the accumulation of estate funds without security. Bairan also attempted to appeal this order, but it was similarly declared interlocutory and unappealable on July 31, 1961. Bairan filed the present certiorari petition to set aside these orders.
ISSUE
Whether the orders dated January 4, 1961 (requiring a surety bond) and June 17, 1961 (requiring surrender of estate properties) are interlocutory and unappealable, and whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing them.
RULING
The Supreme Court held that the contested orders were final and appealable, not interlocutory. An order is final if it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, leaving no substantial proceeding except execution. The order of January 4, 1961 finally decided that Bairan must file a bond, and the order of June 17, 1961 finally decided that Bairan must surrender the estate properties; after these rulings, nothing substantial remained except compliance. However, the Court denied the writs prayed for because the orders were correct and the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion. It was within the probate court’s jurisdiction to require a bond from Bairan, who possessed estate properties and collected considerable sums, for the protection of the estate. The order to surrender the properties was also proper, as Bairan had expressed willingness to do so, and generally, estate properties should be in the possession of the executor. The petition was dismissed, and the preliminary injunction was set aside.
