G.R. No. 170126; June 9, 2009.
Philippine Veterans Bank, Petitioner, vs. Solid Homes, Inc., Respondent.

FACTS

The case originated from a compromise agreement dated April 3, 1992, between petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank and respondent Solid Homes, Inc., for the repurchase by respondent of mortgaged properties. Respondent filed a complaint for specific performance, sum of money, and damages in the RTC of Pasig City, alleging petitioner violated the agreement. Petitioner claimed respondent breached it by failing to pay amortizations, justifying unilateral rescission. The RTC, in a resolution dated February 22, 1994, denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss and granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner filed a belated notice of appeal, withdrew it, and instead assailed the February 22, 1994 resolution via a petition for certiorari, which was dismissed. Petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court, but it was denied for being filed out of time. The February 22, 1994 resolution became final and executory on June 8, 1994. Respondent later filed a motion for clarification regarding an interest rate discrepancy in the resolution, which the RTC granted in an order dated May 6, 1999. Petitioner assailed this order via a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 138993), which the Supreme Court dismissed. On June 14, 2005, respondent filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the February 22, 1994 resolution. The RTC granted the motion and issued a writ on July 15, 2005. Petitioner assailed these in a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the CA, which was dismissed for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order. The CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE

Whether the prescriptive period for executing the February 22, 1994 resolution had prescribed, rendering respondent’s motion for execution filed on June 14, 2005, untimely.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled against petitioner, holding that the execution had not prescribed. The February 22, 1994 resolution became final and executory on June 8, 1994, which is also the date of entry of judgment. The prescriptive period for execution by motion is five years from entry, and by action for revival of judgment is ten years. Petitioner argued the ten-year period ended on June 8, 2004, and respondent’s motion filed in 2005 was late. Respondent contended that various actions filed by petitioner interrupted the prescriptive period. The Court agreed in part. It held that petitioner’s initial attacks on the February 22, 1994 resolution (via motion for reconsideration, petition for certiorari in the CA, and petition for review in the Supreme Court) did not toll the prescriptive period, as original certiorari proceedings do not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a writ of injunction is issued, which was not the case here. However, the Court held that the period during which respondent’s motion for clarification (filed March 31, 1999) and the subsequent petition for certiorari filed by petitioner (G.R. No. 138993, assailing the May 6, 1999 order) were pending should be excluded from the computation of the prescriptive period. The Court reasoned that G.R. No. 138993, while a certiorari proceeding, had a peculiar nature as it involved a clarification to rectify a falsification in the record regarding the interest rate, and petitioner’s filing of it was a blatant attempt to modify a final judgment. Therefore, the running of the prescriptive period was tolled during the pendency of these proceedings. Consequently, respondent’s motion for execution filed on June 14, 2005, was within the prescriptive period. The CA resolutions dismissing petitioner’s petition were affirmed.