G.R. No. 140316 ; August 1, 2002
Jeffrey Dayrit, petitioner, vs. Philippine Bank of Communications, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Jeffrey Dayrit and his wife obtained a P15 million loan from respondent Philippine Bank of Communications, secured by a mortgage on their house and lot in Quezon City. Upon their failure to pay, the bank foreclosed the mortgage, purchased the property at the public auction, and, after the redemption period lapsed in May 1993, consolidated its title. As the Dayrits refused to vacate, the bank filed a petition for a writ of possession with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Dayrits appeared at the first hearing but failed to attend subsequent hearings. Consequently, the RTC allowed the bank to present evidence ex parte and, on August 10, 1995, granted the writ. The Dayrits received the decision on September 15, 1995, but filed a motion for reconsideration only on October 17, 1995 (32 days later), which was denied. Their appeal to the Court of Appeals was dismissed for being filed late and for lack of merit, prompting this petition.

ISSUE

The main issue is whether petitioner was denied due process. This subsumes the following: (1) whether the ex parte presentation of evidence by the respondent was proper; (2) whether the trial court had a ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession; and (3) whether petitioner’s appeal was belatedly filed.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals.
1. On due process and ex parte proceedings: The Court held petitioner was not denied due process. The records showed he was furnished copies of orders resetting hearings and deeming the case submitted for decision. Having actively participated initially and received proper notices, his failure to attend hearings was his own neglect. The trial court correctly allowed ex parte presentation of evidence.
2. On the nature of the writ of possession: The Court reiterated that the issuance of a writ of possession after consolidation of title in an extrajudicial foreclosure is a ministerial function of the court. The legality of the mortgage cannot be collaterally attacked in such a proceeding.
3. On the timeliness of the appeal: The Court found the appeal was filed out of time. Petitioner received the RTC decision on September 15, 1995. His motion for reconsideration filed 32 days later was already beyond the 15-day reglementary period under the Interim Rules, rendering the decision final and executory. His claim of not receiving notice was belied by the registry return card, and he was estopped from questioning the mode of service as he had acquiesced to it throughout the proceedings. The perfection of an appeal within the prescribed period is mandatory and jurisdictional.