G.R. No. 113685 June 19, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, accused-appellants.

FACTS

Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, along with two unidentified individuals, was charged with the kidnapping of Bienvenido Openda, Jr. on August 5, 1991, in Davao City. The information alleged that while Openda, Jr. was drinking with friends, the accused, armed with handguns and using force and intimidation, grabbed, handcuffed, and took him away, depriving him of his liberty. Bernal pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented witnesses, including Adonis Sagarino, who testified that he saw Bernal at a billiard hall with two companions, overheard Bernal dispatch one to check if a person (later identified as Openda, Jr.) was at a store, and later saw the two companions bring a handcuffed Openda, Jr. past the hall. Roberto Racasa, who was drinking with Openda, Jr., testified that Bernal joined them briefly, left, and then two men arrived, asked for “Payat” (Openda, Jr.’s nickname), handcuffed him, and took him away. Salito Enriquez testified that Openda, Jr. had confided about having an illicit affair with Bernal’s wife, providing a motive. The defense claimed Openda, Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by police and not kidnapped. The victim remained missing. The Regional Trial Court found Bernal guilty of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, ordering him to indemnify the victim’s mother. Bernal appealed, arguing his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and challenging the credibility of witnesses.

ISSUE

Whether the guilt of accused-appellant Theodore Bernal for the crime of kidnapping was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The Court held that the essential element of kidnapping—the deprivation of liberty—was duly proved. Bernal acted in conspiracy with the two unknown individuals, as shown by their concerted acts indicating unity of thought and purpose. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient: Sagarino’s testimony placed Bernal with the accomplices planning and confirming the victim’s presence; Racasa’s testimony established the sequence where Bernal left just before the abduction; and Enriquez’s testimony provided motive (the victim’s affair with Bernal’s wife), which, coupled with the circumstantial evidence, helped establish Bernal’s identity as a perpetrator. The victim’s declaration about the affair to Enriquez was admissible as a declaration against interest under Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, as the declarant was unable to testify and the statement was against his own interest. The Court found no compelling reason to overturn the trial court’s findings on witness credibility, noting that alleged inconsistencies in testimonies (e.g., whether Bernal returned with his child) were reconcilable and did not undermine the prosecution’s case. The prolonged disappearance of the victim supported the kidnapping charge. The Court modified the penalty, imposing reclusion temporal in its maximum period as the minimum penalty to reclusion perpetua as the maximum, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The appealed decision was affirmed in toto.