G.R. No. 257982 . February 22, 2023
FATIMA B. GONZALES-ASDALA, PETITIONER, VS. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

In June 2002, petitioner Fatima B. Gonzales-Asdala and her husband, Wynne B. Asdala, applied for a loan from respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) to finance the renovation of their house, built on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 377659, registered in the name of “Wynne B. Asdala, married to Fatima G. Asdala.” The TCT was issued in 1988, seven years after their marriage in 1981. They executed Promissory Notes containing a provision for the procurement of a Mortgage Redemption Insurance (MRI) if required by Metrobank and constituted a Real Estate Mortgage on the land as security. Metrobank subsequently billed them for MRI premiums. On March 24, 2008, Wynne died. Petitioner notified Metrobank and requested the discharge of the mortgage, claiming the MRI premiums had been paid and the proceeds should be applied to the loan upon her husband’s death. Metrobank denied the request, asserting the MRI was applied for and issued only in petitioner’s name, and that premium payments were sourced from her sole savings account. Metrobank then demanded payment for unpaid amortizations. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance, Injunction and Damages, arguing the MRI should cover the loan due to her husband’s death and that the mortgaged property was his exclusive property, making him the mortgagor and insured. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint, ruling the property was presumed conjugal and petitioner, as a co-mortgagor, could secure an MRI on her life alone. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE

1. Whether the parcel of land subject of the real estate mortgage is conjugal property.
2. Whether petitioner’s husband was the insured under the subject Mortgage Redemption Insurance (MRI).

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision.
1. The parcel of land is conjugal property. The Court upheld the factual findings of the lower courts. The TCT, issued in 1988 during the marriage, was the sole evidence presented by petitioner regarding the property’s acquisition. Absent any other proof, the property is presumed conjugal under the governing law (the Civil Code, as their marriage was in 1981). The presumption of conjugality is rebuttable only by strong, clear, and convincing evidence, which petitioner failed to provide. The question of whether the property was acquired during the marriage is a factual issue, and the trial court’s determination, affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded great weight.
2. The insured under the MRI is petitioner, not her husband. The Court found that the MRI was taken solely on petitioner’s life. The documents for procuring the MRI were signed only by petitioner, the Certificate of Group Life Insurance was issued in her name alone, and the insurance premiums were debited from her personal savings account. As the property was conjugal, both spouses were mortgagors. Under the Insurance Code, the consent of a spouse is not necessary for a married person to take out an insurance policy on his or her own life. Therefore, petitioner, as a co-mortgagor, could validly secure an MRI on her life without similar action by her husband. The death of her husband did not activate the insurer’s commitment under the MRI, as he was not the insured. The loan obligation and the real estate mortgage securing it subsist.