G.R. No. L-16949, March 18, 1967
ROSALINA SANTOS, ETC., ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

On September 19, 1958, Senator Rogelio de la Rosa requested the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to act on a petition from residents of Sexmoan, Pampanga, to reopen certain creeks, rivers, or streams allegedly converted into fishponds, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2056. The Secretary designated an investigator, Atty. Jesus Lazaro, to probe the alleged encroachments on public navigable waterways. The investigation covered two fishponds: “Mandayag,” registered in the name of the late Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas (estate administered by plaintiff Rosalina Santos), and “Paculayo,” registered in the names of spouses Jose S. Chivi, Jr. and Lydia R. Chivi (the other plaintiffs). After hearings, the investigator submitted a report. On February 3, 1959, the Secretary ordered the plaintiffs to remove fishpond constructions from Sapang Mandayag, Paculayo River, and Paculayo Creek and restore the waterways to their original condition within 30 days, with removal by the government at the plaintiffs’ expense if non-compliant.
The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga seeking to declare the Secretary’s decision null and void and/or to declare Republic Act No. 2056 unconstitutional. They argued that the fishponds were private properties registered under the Land Registration Act, that the Act was ex post facto and delegated judicial power to administrative officials, that complainants in the administrative case were not real parties in interest, and that the Secretary had no authority to investigate their titles. The Secretary contended that the court lacked jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, that the Act was constitutional, that factual findings in administrative investigations are conclusive, and that the Torrens titles did not include public waterways.
The lower court declared the Secretary’s decision null and void and made permanent a preliminary injunction, but disallowed damages. The Secretary appealed, assigning errors regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies, abuse of discretion in reviewing court decisions, and the ex post facto nature of Republic Act No. 2056.

ISSUE

1. Whether plaintiffs were required to exhaust administrative remedies by appealing the Secretary’s decision to the President before seeking judicial relief.
2. Whether the Secretary committed gross abuse of discretion by investigating and ordering the removal of fishpond constructions on waterways, thereby allegedly reviewing or reversing court decisions granting registration of the properties.
3. Whether Republic Act No. 2056 is ex post facto as applied to fishponds constructed long before its enactment.

RULING

1. On exhaustion of administrative remedies: The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply. Department Secretaries are alter egos of the President, and the Secretary’s decision is presumed to be the President’s unless disapproved. Thus, an appeal to the President would be futile, and plaintiffs were not precluded from seeking judicial relief directly.
2. On abuse of discretion and review of court decisions: The Court found no gross abuse of discretion by the Secretary regarding the “Paculayo” fishpond. Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power, and a Torrens title’s silence on the existence of a navigable stream does not preclude a subsequent administrative investigation and determination of its existence. The investigator’s report provided substantial evidence (including survey plans and testimonies) proving the existence and navigability of Paculayo River and Sapang Paculayo, which were enclosed within the Chivis’ fishpond. The Secretary’s factual findings, supported by evidence, are respected in the absence of illegality, error of law, fraud, or imposition.
However, as to the “Mandayag” fishpond, the investigator’s report failed to determine the exact location, width, and length of Sapang Mandayag. The report recommended dismissal without prejudice due to lack of conclusive evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint against Rosalina Santos regarding “Mandayag” without prejudice to further reinvestigation, upholding her “cardinal primary right” to a decision based on substantial evidence.
3. On the ex post facto challenge: The Court held that Republic Act No. 2056 is not ex post facto. The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws applies only to criminal cases. Here, plaintiffs were not criminally prosecuted; they were merely ordered to demolish illegal constructions on public navigable waterways. The Act authorizes the summary demolition of public nuisances by the Secretary after due process, which is an exercise of administrative authority existing since Act No. 3208, not the coercive power of criminal law.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The decision of the lower court is REVERSED as to the “Paculayo” fishpond, and the writ of injunction is annulled and set aside. It is AFFIRMED as to the “Mandayag” fishpond, dismissing the complaint without prejudice due to lack of substantial evidence on the waterway’s location, length, and width. Costs are awarded against appellees Jose S. Chivi, Jr. and Lydia R. Chivi.