G.R. No. L-21113, April 27, 1967
MIGUEL OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, and DR. GREGORIO VENTURANZA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Miguel Ocampo filed a complaint for damages against respondent Dr. Gregorio Venturanza in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-6042. After Venturanza filed an answer with counterclaim and Ocampo replied, the case was set for hearing on February 19, 1962. Notice was received by Venturanza’s counsel on December 9, 1961. On the trial date, neither Venturanza nor his counsel appeared. Consequently, the court allowed Ocampo to present his evidence ex parte. On March 19, 1962, the court rendered judgment in favor of Ocampo, ordering Venturanza to pay sums for reimbursement, damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. Counsel for Venturanza received a copy of the decision on March 27, 1962. On April 30, 1962, four days after the period for filing a motion for reconsideration had expired, Venturanza’s counsel filed a motion for reconsideration and for relief from judgment on the ground of excusable negligence, alleging that the filing clerk who received the notice of hearing fell ill and forgot about it. Ocampo opposed the motion. On June 5, 1962, Ocampo filed a motion for execution. On July 10, 1962, the court denied Venturanza’s motion for lack of merit and granted Ocampo’s motion for execution. On July 30, 1962, Venturanza filed a notice of withdrawal of his counsel, an urgent motion to dissolve the execution order, and a notice of appeal. On August 1, 1962, during the hearing on the motion to dissolve, the respondent judge, motu proprio, orally ordered the setting aside of the March 19, 1962 decision and reset the case for hearing. This order was later issued in writing on November 12, 1962. Ocampo then filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge had the power or jurisdiction to set aside his decision of March 19, 1962 and reopen the case for trial after the decision had become final and executory.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The decision of March 19, 1962 became final and executory after the period to move for reconsideration or appeal expired on April 26, 1962, with no such motion or appeal having been filed. Once a judgment becomes final, it is removed from the court’s jurisdiction to alter, amend, or revoke; the court retains only the power to order its execution. Relief from judgment under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The excuse offered by Venturanza’s counsel—that the filing clerk fell ill and forgot the notice—was deemed neither credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence, following precedent. The Court emphasized that clients are bound by the negligence of their attorneys. Therefore, the respondent judge’s order of November 12, 1962 was a grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted the petition, revoked the November 12, 1962 order, and permanently enjoined the respondent judge from reopening the case, directing him instead to issue a writ of execution for the March 19, 1962 decision. Costs were imposed on respondent Venturanza.