GR L 24322; (July, 1967) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-24322 July 21, 1967
IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NO. 14, AS AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 22, SERIES OF 1964 OF ORMOC CITY. ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY and HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as MAYOR of Ormoc City, respondents-appellees.
FACTS
Petitioner-appellant Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Court of First Instance of Leyte to test the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 14 of Ormoc City, as amended by Ordinance No. 22, series of 1964. The amendatory ordinance, enacted on October 28, 1964, imposed a city tax of twenty centavos (P0.20) per picul on all production of centrifugal sugar locally sold or sold within the Philippines, and one percentum (1%) on the gross sale of its derivatives and by-products produced by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, or by any other sugar mills in Ormoc City. The lower court sustained the validity of the ordinance in its decision dated January 28, 1965, prompting the petitioner to appeal.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the Municipal Ordinance No. 14, as amended by Ordinance No. 22, is a valid exercise of the taxing power of Ormoc City.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, upholding the validity of the ordinance. The Court ruled that the grant of taxing power to chartered cities under Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act (Republic Act No. 2264, enacted June 19, 1959) is sufficiently plenary and broad. This power covers everything except those specifically mentioned as exceptions in the law, subject only to the limitations that the tax levied is for public purposes, just, and uniform. The Court cited precedents, including Hodges v. Municipal Board, which established the doctrine that chartered cities have extensive autonomy in enacting taxing measures. The Court found no constitutional or statutory infirmity in the ordinance. It also rejected the petitioner’s claim that the ordinance was an illegal restraint of trade, noting the absence of a clear showing of transgression of a constitutional provision or repugnancy to a controlling statute. The appeal was dismissed without costs.