G.R. No. 211089 , July 11, 2023
SPOUSES DR. JOHN O. MALIGA AND ANNIELYN DELA CRUZ MALIGA, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES ABRAHIM N. TINGAO AND BAI SHOR TINGAO, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. No. 211135] SPOUSES DR. JOHN O. MALIGA AND ANNIELYN DELA CRUZ MALIGA, PETITIONERS, VS. DIMASURANG UNTE, JR., RESPONDENT.

FACTS

This case involves a Separate Concurring Opinion by Justice Leonen. The main case pertains to the jurisdiction of Shari’a courts. The opinion discusses the need to strengthen the shari’ah justice system as part of the national legal framework. It notes that the Muslim Code (Presidential Decree No. 1083) recognized the Islamic legal system as part of the law of the land but codified only a portion of it, primarily covering personal law. The opinion examines the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, particularly over “customary contracts” between Muslim parties. It also reviews subsequent laws like Republic Act No. 6734 (the ARMM Organic Act), its amendment Republic Act No. 9054 , and its repeal Republic Act No. 11054 (the Bangsamoro Organic Law), which expanded the envisioned jurisdiction of shari’ah courts to include commercial and criminal matters. The opinion argues for a judicial construction that interprets the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over customary contracts as exclusive and original.

ISSUE

The core issue addressed in the concurring opinion is the proper interpretation of the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts, specifically under Article 143(1)(d) of the Muslim Code concerning “customary contracts” between Muslim parties, and whether this jurisdiction should be considered exclusive and original to the exclusion of civil courts, in light of the constitutional and statutory recognition of the shari’ah legal system.

RULING

Justice Leonen, in his Separate Concurring Opinion, submits that the Supreme Court should interpret the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts under Article 143(1)(d) of the Muslim Code as exclusive and original over all actions arising from contracts between Muslim parties who did not stipulate which law shall govern their relations. This interpretation is advanced to recognize the expertise of shari’ah judges in applying Islamic laws, from which civil court judges may lack competence, and to give full effect to the Muslim Code’s recognition of shari’ah as part of the law of the land. The opinion emphasizes that the Muslim Code’s ambiguity regarding “customary contracts” and the shari’ah courts’ jurisdiction over uncodified aspects of Islamic law requires this construction. It further notes that subsequent laws (Republic Act Nos. 6734, 9054, and 11054) demonstrate a legislative intent to expand the shari’ah justice system beyond personal laws to include commercial and criminal matters, reinforcing the need for this exclusive jurisdictional interpretation to rectify the historical exclusion of shari’ah from the national legal framework.