G.R. No. L-23638 and L-23662; October 12, 1967
DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners, vs. ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent. / MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA REYES, petitioners, vs. ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

FACTS

On January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba petitioned the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of the purported last will and testament of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, which instituted her as the sole heir. The intestate heirs of Benedicta de los Reyes (the petitioners) filed oppositions to the probate on grounds of forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent, and revocation of the will. They claimed the will was revoked by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate executed by the testatrix in favor of Dimagiba in 1943 and 1944, which conveyances were later set aside by the Supreme Court in 1954. After trial, the Court of First Instance, on June 20, 1958, found the will genuine and properly executed but deferred resolution on the issues of estoppel and implied revocation. The oppositors sought reconsideration, and on July 27, 1959, the court overruled the estoppel claim but reserved the issue of implied revocation. On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence, the trial court held the will was not revoked by the subsequent deeds of sale. The oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the probate decree had become final for lack of an opportune appeal and that there was no implied revocation. The oppositors then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1. Whether the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal.
2. Whether the order overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors had likewise become final.
3. Whether the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944.

RULING

1. Yes, the probate decree had become final and conclusive. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that a probate decree finally settles all questions concerning the capacity of the testator and the proper execution of the will, and such an order is final and appealable under Section 1 of Rule 109. Since the oppositors did not appeal this decree on time, it became final.
2. The defense of estoppel is patently unmeritorious. The Court ruled that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy designed to protect the testator’s expressed wishes. Public policy cannot be evaded on the pretext of estoppel.
3. No, the will was not impliedly revoked. The Court held that Article 957(2) of the Civil Code (on implied revocation) is based on a presumed change of intention by the testator. The existence of such a change was rendered doubtful because the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, Dimagiba, and no consideration was paid. The Court found that the testatrix likely intended to comply in advance with her testamentary provisions rather than alter them. Furthermore, the annulment of the conveyances was due to undue influence, meaning the transferor was not expressing her own free will, so it could not be concluded she intended to abandon the original legacy. Thus, Article 957 does not apply to this case. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.