G.R. No. L-28490 February 28, 1968
DOMACAO ALONTO, DATU GASANARA LUCMAN, HADJI MAPUNUD, DATU-IMAM, SHEIK ISMAEL LAUT, and SULTAN GUILING BUNTALIS, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LANAO DEL SUR, LINANG MANDANGAN, KASAN MAROHOMBSAR, IBRAHIM ALI, CARIM DIPATUAN, and BADIONAID BALUT, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioners were Liberal Party candidates for provincial offices in Lanao del Sur in the November 14, 1967 elections. They filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (Comelec) seeking the permanent suspension of the canvass of votes from 27 municipalities, the rejection of the returns from those municipalities, and the suspension of the proclamation of results. They alleged the returns were “obviously manufactured” due to fraud, irregularities, and terrorism. The Comelec denied their petition, citing its lack of authority to look beyond the face of authentic returns. In a motion for reconsideration, petitioners added the ground that the counting of votes was null and void because it was not done in the designated polling places immediately after the election, but instead was conducted in PC camps in various locations three days after election day, violating Sections 144 and 151 of the Election Code. After the Comelec denied their motion, petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court, alleging grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE

Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to order the rejection of the contested election returns and suspend the canvass based on the grounds that: (1) the counting was done outside the polling places in PC camps and three days after the election; (2) the Comelec had already rejected returns from the same precincts in the senatorial canvass; and (3) the returns were statistically improbable and thus obviously manufactured.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. It held that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
1. On the first ground, the Court ruled that the transfer of the counting to PC camps and its conduct three days after the election, under the circumstances, did not justify the summary rejection of the returns. External circumstances, such as threats of violence, may compel such transfers to ensure the safety of election officers and the integrity of the count. The evidence indicated the transfers were authorized by Comelec or its provincial representatives, often upon request of the inspectors or the Liberal Party representatives themselves. The Comelec’s denial of the petitioners’ motion amounted to a ratification of these actions. The Court emphasized that the law’s provisions are designed to assist voters, not to defeat their will, and irregularities in the conduct of the count do not automatically nullify the votes honestly cast.
2. On the second ground, the Court held that the Comelec’s prior rejection of certain returns in its role as the senatorial canvassing board did not bind the provincial boards of canvassers. The provincial boards are entitled to use their own judgment on the returns before them, which are different copies. Discrepancies should be addressed through a judicial recount under the Election Code, not through an a priori rejection.
3. On the third ground, the Court found the alleged statistical improbabilities (excess of votes over registered voters) insufficient to declare the returns “obviously manufactured” under the Lagumbay doctrine. The returns did not show the uniformity of tallies and systematic blanking of opponents characteristic of manufactured returns. The Court noted one apparent discrepancy was likely a clerical error in recording the number of registered voters.
The Court concluded that the petitioners’ attempt to nullify the canvass based on irregularities unrelated to the correctness and authenticity of the returns resembled a maneuver to paralyze proclamation and prolong hold-over terms. The restraining order was dissolved.