G.R. No. L-25314 February 10, 1968
Municipality of Tacurong, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Rosario Abragan, et al., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

On October 9, 1956, Executive Proclamation No. 351 declared Lot No. 6001, PLS-73, in Tacurong, Cotabato, as land reserved for Municipal Site Purposes and withdrew it from sale or settlement. Portions of the land were occupied by Rosario Abragan, Ramona Pirales, Teofilo Apilado, Ester Apilado (for residential purposes), and the Tacurong Evangelical Church (for religious purposes). On August 29, 1961, the Municipality of Tacurong filed a complaint for recovery of possession against the occupants in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, alleging they refused repeated demands to vacate. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it stated no cause of action because the proclamation provided for compensation to occupants for their improvements, and the complaint lacked an allegation of an offer or refusal of compensation prior to filing. They also claimed the complaint should have been filed by the Solicitor General or an authorized attorney. The court initially ruled the complaint sufficient and that the municipality could engage its own counsel. Upon reconsideration, citing a portion of the proclamation stating the municipality “shall make proper arrangements for the compensation and/or removal of said improvements,” the court dismissed the case, holding the complaint did not allege fulfillment of these conditions precedent. The plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied, with the court stating it could take judicial notice of the proclamation. The plaintiff appealed, and the case was certified to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.

ISSUE

1. Whether the complaint stated a sufficient cause of action.
2. Whether the lower court properly took judicial notice of Executive Proclamation No. 351.

RULING

1. Yes, the complaint stated a sufficient cause of action. A complaint’s sufficiency is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. The complaint alleged the executive proclamation reserving the land and the defendants’ repeated refusal to vacate despite demands. The alleged right to compensation under the proclamation is a matter for the defendants to plead as a defense in their answer and at trial, not a condition precedent that must be alleged in the complaint to establish a cause of action.
2. Yes, the lower court properly took judicial notice of Executive Proclamation No. 351, as executive proclamations are among the matters subject to judicial notice under the Rules of Court. However, the lower court erred in considering the offer of payment as a condition precedent to the enforceability of the proclamation. The cited portion refers to “compensation and/or removal,” indicating compensation is not always required. It is for the defendants to show they are entitled to compensation.
The dismissal order was reversed, and the case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. No costs.