G.R. No. L-23861. February 17, 1968.
EMILIANA CRUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. ERNESTO OPPEN INC., HON. CRISANTO ARAGON, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Manila and THE SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

On March 28, 1963, the City Court (formerly Municipal Court) of Manila rendered a judgment by default against petitioner Emiliana Cruz in an ejectment suit, ordering her to vacate Stall No. 78 of the Manila Cartimar Market, pay arrears of P71.00, and pay daily rentals from March 20, 1963. Cruz moved to set aside the default order, decision, and writ of execution on May 22, 1963, alleging lack of jurisdiction over her person because summons and the complaint were served on her salesgirl, Teresita Burce, who did not deliver them to her. The motion was denied on May 25, 1963. A motion for reconsideration and new trial, supported by Burce’s affidavit, was filed on June 4, 1963, and denied on June 8, 1963. On August 1, 1963, Cruz filed a petition for relief under Rule 38 in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The respondents argued the petition was time-barred and that the salesgirl’s negligence was not excusable. The Court of First Instance dismissed the petition on July 3, 1964, finding it was filed 71 days after Cruz learned of the judgment, exceeding the 60-day reglementary period. A motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance correctly dismissed the petition for relief from judgment.

RULING

Yes, the Court of First Instance correctly dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal for several reasons:
1. The petition for relief was filed out of time. Cruz learned of the judgment on May 22, 1963, at the latest, as stated in her motion filed that day. She filed the petition for relief on August 1, 1963, which was 71 days later, exceeding the 60-day period prescribed by Section 3, Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court. This period is fixed, inextendible, and never interrupted.
2. The time consumed by Cruz’s motions in the City Court (to set aside the default and for reconsideration) did not toll the running of the 60-day period. The City Court had no jurisdiction to grant relief from judgment under Rule 38, making those motions ineffective for that purpose.
3. The affidavits submitted by Cruz failed to show a meritorious defense. They did not establish that a different result was probable if a new trial were granted, as they essentially admitted non-payment of rentals, which was the basis for the ejectment.
4. There was no showing of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The salesgirl’s failure to deliver the summons, followed by her departure to Albay without communicating with Cruz, did not constitute excusable negligence.
5. The Court of First Instance did not err in issuing the dismissal order without a separate hearing. The respondents’ motion for resolution of their answer was, in effect, a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 19, as the answer raised only issues of law based on the admitted facts in the pleadings. A hearing was unnecessary.
6. Any procedural error in not holding a hearing was harmless. Cruz had the opportunity to fully argue her position in her motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order. A remand would be a useless ceremony since the petition was substantively without merit.
The orders of the Court of First Instance were affirmed. Costs against petitioner.