G.R. No. L-22579 February 23, 1968
ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner, vs. HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

On February 27, 1963, petitioner Rolando Landicho was charged with bigamy before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, presided by respondent Judge Lorenzo Relova. The information alleged he contracted a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia while his first marriage to Elvira Makatangay remained legally undissolved. Subsequently, on March 15, 1963, the second wife, Fe Lourdes Pasia, filed a civil action before the same court seeking to annul her marriage to Landicho on grounds of force, threats, intimidation, and its bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, Landicho, as defendant in that civil case, filed a third-party complaint against his first wife, Elvira Makatangay, praying for the annulment of his first marriage on the same grounds of force, threats, and intimidation. Landicho then moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal bigamy case pending the resolution of the civil suits concerning the validity of the two marriages. Respondent Judge denied this motion and a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Landicho filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition, arguing that the civil actions constitute a prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the criminal case.

ISSUE

Whether the existence of civil suits for the annulment of the petitioner’s two marriages constitutes a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal prosecution for bigamy.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and dissolved the preliminary injunction. The Court held that the civil suits do not constitute a prejudicial question in the pending bigamy case. The Court distinguished this case from precedents like Merced v. Diez and Zapanta v. Mendoza, where the prejudicial question existed because the validity of the second marriage—an essential element of the crime of bigamy—was directly in issue in a civil action filed before the criminal prosecution. Here, the criminal case for bigamy was filed first. The civil action to annul the second marriage was filed later by the second wife, and the petitioner’s third-party complaint to annul the first marriage was filed even later. The Court emphasized the principle, citing Viada, that parties to a marriage cannot judge its nullity for themselves; only a competent court can declare a marriage void. Prior to such a judicial declaration, the first marriage is presumed valid. By contracting a second marriage before obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first, the petitioner assumed the risk of prosecution for bigamy. The respondent Judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to suspend the criminal proceedings. Costs were imposed on the petitioner.