GR 84460; (November, 1992) (Digest)
G.R. No. 84460 November 13, 1992
FIRST PLYWOOD CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PHILIPPINES PORTS AUTHORITY, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner First Plywood Corporation (FPC) was impleaded as defendant in a complaint filed by private respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City to collect arrastre service charges amounting to P154,445.62, exclusive of interest. PPA’s demand was based on Paragraph B2(1) of its Administrative Orders No. 02-80 and 05-81, which prescribes higher rates for services involving “greater work than hooking the net or sling containing cargo from the carrying truck to the ship’s tackle.” FPC refused to pay these higher rates, contending that the services rendered fell under Paragraph B in relation to Sub-paragraphs (1) and (3) of the same orders, which prescribe a lower rate for services consisting “only of the labor in hooking the net or sling containing the cargo from the carrying truck to the ship’s tackle.” The trial court ruled in favor of FPC, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, ordering FPC to pay P79,582.45 plus legal interest. FPC’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the arrastre services performed by PPA for FPC’s cargo were limited to “the labor in hooking” or constituted “greater work than hooking,” thereby authorizing PPA to charge the higher rates under its administrative orders.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the services rendered by PPA involved “greater work than hooking.” The evidence, including testimonies from PPA’s foreman and supervisor, established that the services included checking the cargo, slinging the cargo while on the truck, signaling for hoisting, handling dunnage, and employing multiple personnel such as a supervisor, foreman, head checker, and hooking men. These tasks went beyond the mere attachment of a hook to a sling or net, which would require only one person. Since the administrative orders did not define “labor in hooking” or “greater work than hooking,” the terms were given their literal meaning. The Court found that the additional works were not merely component parts of hooking but constituted greater work, justifying the application of the higher rates under Paragraph B2(1) of PPA’s administrative orders.