G.R. No. 102881 December 7, 1992
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR. and SUN VALLEY MANUFACTURING & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS

Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation (Toyota) and Sun Valley Manufacturing and Development Corporation (Sun Valley) are registered owners of adjoining parcels of land in La Huerta, Parañaque, purchased from the Asset Privatization Trust (APT). The properties formerly belonged to Delta Motors Corporation, were foreclosed by PNB, and transferred to APT for disposition. APT classified and subdivided the properties (GC III-Delta Motors Corporation into Delta I, II, III, with further subdivisions like Delta I into Lots 1, 2, 3) for bidding. Toyota purchased part of Delta I (Lot 2) on May 12, 1988, and constructed a perimeter fence. Sun Valley purchased another part of Delta I (Lot 1) on October 5, 1990. Sun Valley claimed Toyota’s fence overlapped onto its property by 723 square meters based on title descriptions and surveys. Negotiations failed, leading to separate court actions.
Toyota filed Civil Case No. 91-2504 (Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, Judge Tensuan) against APT and Sun Valley for reformation of its Deed of Sale with APT, alleging the title failed to include the disputed strip due to a flaw in APT’s cataloguing. Toyota sought a TRO and preliminary injunction against destruction of its fence. Sun Valley moved to dismiss, arguing no cause of action and collateral attack on its title. Judge Tensuan initially denied Toyota’s injunction but later granted a writ of preliminary injunction on December 17, 1991. Sun Valley challenged orders via certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Sp. No. 26942 and CA-G.R. No. 26813).
Simultaneously, Sun Valley filed Civil Case No. 91-2550 (RTC Makati, Branch 61, Judge Gorospe) for recovery of possession of the 723 sqm. On September 16, 1991, Judge Gorospe issued a TRO against Toyota. Toyota moved to dismiss, arguing the case was an ejectment matter within Metropolitan Trial Court jurisdiction. Sun Valley filed an amended complaint alleging Toyota’s possession began in September 1988. Judge Gorospe admitted the amended complaint and later granted Sun Valley’s application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction on October 1, 1991, ordering Toyota to vacate and restore possession. Toyota challenged these orders via certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA- G.R. No. 26152 , Tenth Division), which denied due course to Toyota’s petition on November 27, 1991, ruling Sun Valley’s action was an accion publiciana, not unlawful detainer, and expunged Toyota’s supplemental petitions for procedural lapses. Judge Gorospe subsequently issued an order on December 2, 1991, allowing Sun Valley to break open and demolish Toyota’s fence.
Toyota filed the present petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court on December 9, 1991. The Supreme Court issued a TRO on December 11, 1991, enjoining implementation of Judge Gorospe’s orders and further proceedings in Civil Case No. 91-2550. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals Second Division issued a TRO and later a preliminary injunction enjoining Judge Tensuan from proceeding with Civil Case No. 91-2504. Toyota filed supplemental petitions challenging these. The Court of Appeals Eleventh Division later dismissed Sun Valley’s petition in CA-G.R. Sp. No. 26942 on April 15, 1992, ruling Toyota’s complaint was not a collateral attack on Sun Valley’s title.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of Appeals Tenth Division gravely abused its discretion in ignoring Toyota’s protests against Judge Gorospe’s injunction orders.
2. Whether Sun Valley is guilty of forum-shopping and Judge Gorospe of case-grabbing.

RULING

The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition for failure to show reversible error or grave abuse of discretion by the respondent court.
On the first issue, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion. It ruled that Sun Valley’s action (Civil Case No. 91-2550) was an accion publiciana for recovery of possession, not an ejectment case, because Toyota’s possession allegedly began in September 1988 (over one year before the suit), placing it beyond the one-year jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. The amended complaint properly alleged this. The Court of Appeals correctly expunged Toyota’s supplemental petitions due to Toyota’s failure to file a motion to admit them, a procedural lapse. The issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction by Judge Gorospe was justified because Sun Valley established a clear legal right to possession based on its Torrens title, while Toyota failed to substantiate its claim of a mistake in the instrument. Between the two, Sun Valley had a better right.
On the second issue, the Court found no forum-shopping. Sun Valley’s two actions (moving to dismiss in Toyota’s case and filing its own recovery case) involved different causes of action and reliefs. In Toyota’s case (for reformation), Sun Valley was a defendant seeking dismissal. In its own case, Sun Valley was a plaintiff seeking recovery of possession. These were not identical, and Sun Valley informed both courts of the related cases. There was no evidence of case-grabbing by Judge Gorospe, as the assignment of cases is done by raffle.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, upholding the validity of the injunctive writs in favor of Sun Valley and the dismissal of Toyota’s petition.