G.R. No. L-29471 and L-29487, September 28, 1968.
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), petitioner, vs. Hon. Joaquin M. Salvador and Social Security System, respondents (L-29471). Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), petitioner, vs. Hon. Joaquin M. Salvador and/or Court of Industrial Relations and Social Security System, respondents (L-29487).

FACTS

The petitioner PAFLU and respondent Social Security System (SSS) were parties to a collective bargaining agreement effective from July 1, 1966, to June 30, 1969. This agreement was adopted as a formal award by the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) on August 5, 1966, in a previously certified case. A dispute later arose regarding the implementation of the agreement’s provisions. Instead of complying, the SSS filed an “urgent petition” with the CIR on August 29, 1968, seeking an interpretation of certain provisions, treating it as part of the earlier certified case. Respondent Judge Joaquin M. Salvador issued an order on August 29, 1968, enjoining the union from striking and management from locking out employees. As PAFLU did not comply, believing the court lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of a new presidential certification, Judge Salvador issued further orders on September 3 and 5, 1968, to lift pickets, return to work, and show cause for contempt. In a related petition, the CIR en banc issued a resolution on September 6, 1968, dismissing PAFLU’s motion for reconsideration of the August 29 order as filed out of time. PAFLU filed petitions for certiorari, assailing the jurisdiction of respondent Judge and the CIR to issue the orders and resolution.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Industrial Relations, through respondent Judge, retained jurisdiction to act on a petition for interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement that was earlier embodied in a CIR award, despite the absence of a new presidential certification of a labor dispute.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court sustained the jurisdiction of respondent Judge and the CIR. The Court held that under Sections 17 and 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (The Court of Industrial Relations Act), the CIR possesses continuing jurisdiction over cases under its control. Specifically, during the effectiveness of an award (which was three years, from July 1, 1966, to June 30, 1969), the CIR may, upon application and after hearing, alter, modify, or set aside such award or reopen any question involved. Furthermore, the CIR is empowered to determine the meaning or interpretation of an award at any time. The original presidential certification that led to the 1966 award was sufficient to vest this continuing jurisdiction; a new certification was not required for the court to interpret the agreement it had formally adopted. The Court cited precedent, including Goseco v. Court of Industrial Relations, establishing that CIR awards are not definitive and beyond recall. The petitions were dismissed. The Court also emphatically disapproved of the petitioner Union’s conduct in disobeying the CIR’s orders.