GR L 22802; (November, 1968) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-22802 November 29, 1968
MAXIMO H. GREGORIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (4th DIVISION) and LORENZO G. VALENTIN, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Maximo H. Gregorio, through his deceased father, filed a special action for certiorari and mandamus assailing two resolutions of the respondent Court of Appeals. The first resolution, dated March 13, 1964, denied a petition to elevate to the Court of Appeals the evidence presented in two cases (CA-G.R. Nos. 33051-R and 33052-R) on appeal from the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The respondent court reasoned that the motion sought to convert an appeal from the denial of a petition for relief under Rule 38 into an appeal from the decision itself. The second resolution, dated April 8, 1964, denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that the applicable procedural rule (Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court) created a new right in derogation of the appellee’s right and that the appeal was perfected before the Revised Rules took effect, thus making the rule inapplicable. The petitioner invoked Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, which allows a party appealing from a judgment denying relief under Rule 38 to also assail the judgment on the merits for lack of evidentiary support.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition to elevate the evidence and in refusing to apply retroactively Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is procedural in nature.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the writs of certiorari and mandamus. The Court held that Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, being procedural, must be given retroactive effect. Procedural laws are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, as long as no vested rights are disturbed. The Court cited established doctrine, beginning with Enrile v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, that retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a party. The respondent appellee, Lorenzo G. Valentin, could not allege any vested right that would preclude such retroactive application. The failure to elevate the evidence would render the new procedural rule nugatory. Therefore, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals were annulled, and it was compelled to elevate the evidence. The period for submitting the appellant’s brief was held in abeyance pending the elevation of the evidence. Costs were imposed on respondent Valentin.