G.R. No. 22717 November 27, 1968
Geminian L. Gonzales, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Saturnina Gonzales, Spouses Hipolito Sese and Josefa Santiano, Spouses Ananias Balilo and Honorata Santiano, Gaudencio Santiano and Eladio Santiano, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

On July 28, 1963, Geminiano L. Gonzales filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 3905) in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against the defendants. The complaint alleged two causes of action. First, that the plaintiff was a co-owner on a fifty-fifty basis of three specified cadastral lots, as declared in a prior final decision (Civil Case No. 806, affirmed by the Court of Appeals). The defendants were in possession of 3.5381 hectares belonging to the plaintiff from 1952 to 1963, and he sought compensation for the produce (palay) he did not receive during that period. Second, the plaintiff alleged that the total land area had a sugar quota, half of which pertained to him, and he sought payment for the defendants’ use of his share of the quota from 1952 to 1963. The complaint prayed for possession of one-half of the land and sugar quota, payment for the unrealized produce and quota use, and damages. The defendants moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of res judicata (bar by prior judgment) and prescription. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, ruling that the claims should have been presented in the prior Civil Case No. 806. The plaintiff appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the final decision in Civil Case No. 806 constitutes res judicata, barring the present action (Civil Case No. 3905) for recovery of possession and fruits of the property.

RULING

Yes, the principle of res judicata applies, barring the present action. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal. The Court held that the matter of possession was already adjudged in the prior decision, as its dispositive portion expressly ordered the defendants to vacate the portions assigned to the plaintiff upon partition. The recognition of the plaintiff’s right to possession was a logical consequence of the judicial declaration of his co-ownership. The plaintiff’s causes of action for recovery of fruits (palay) and the use of the sugar quota from 1952 to 1963 were based on his ownership of a half portion of the lots, which ownership was precisely litigated in Civil Case No. 806. These matters should have been pleaded in that prior case. The rule is that a former judgment bars not only matters expressly adjudged but also all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. The sugar quota, being an improvement attached to the land by law, falls under the same reasoning. Therefore, the plaintiff’s failure to raise these issues in the first case precludes him from ventilating them in a separate proceeding.