GR 29676; (December, 1968) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-29676 December 24, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO, as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch); MARIO HENSON y DE GUZMAN; RAFAEL GONZALES y SINCHONGCO; ANGEL MENDOZA y MARQUEZ; ROGELIO LAZARO y MAURICIO, and BIENVENIDO WIJANGCO, respondents.
FACTS
In Criminal Case No. Q-8711 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, the defendants were charged as principals for the murder of Jesus Lapid, with qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The prosecution and defense agreed that the defendants’ motions for bail would be considered during the regular trial instead of in a separate summary proceeding. During the regular trial, after the prosecution had presented eight witnesses, the trial court resolved the motions for bail and granted them over the prosecution’s objection that it still had material witnesses to present. The court granted bail at P50,000 for each defendant on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong. The fiscal’s motion for reconsideration contained contumacious language, for which he was cited for contempt, but the judge later forgave him on condition the offending words be deleted.
ISSUE
Whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process in the resolution of the motions for bail.
RULING
Yes, the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The Supreme Court held that whether a motion for bail in a capital offense is resolved in a summary proceeding or during a regular trial, the prosecution must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all evidence it desires to introduce before the court resolves the motion. Denying this opportunity violates procedural due process and renders the bail order void. The orders dated October 7, 9, and 12, 1968, were issued in violation of this due process requirement and are therefore null and void. Additionally, the orders were defective in form and substance because they did not contain a summary of the prosecution’s evidence, only the court’s conclusion that the evidence of guilt was not strong. A court’s discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be based on a summary of the evidence to prevent it from being uncontrolled, capricious, or whimsical. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the orders granting bail and granted the petition for certiorari.
