G.R. No. 101256. March 8, 1993.
SPOUSES PEPITO AND LORETO LAUS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR C. CEGUERA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 82; NILO SM. CABANG, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City and CONSUELO P. TORRES, respondents.

FACTS

On August 24, 1989, private respondent Consuelo P. Torres filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against petitioners Spouses Pepito and Loreto Laus. The complaint alleged that petitioner Loreto Alfaro-Laus executed a promissory note in favor of Torres but failed to pay the full amount upon maturity. On October 10, 1989, Deputy Sheriff Romeo Cruz attempted to serve the summons at the petitioners’ residence. Upon being informed that the petitioners were not around, he immediately resorted to substituted service by leaving the summons with a certain Josephine Areola, without inquiring about her age, the petitioners’ whereabouts, or when they were expected to return. The sheriff’s return did not indicate the impossibility of personal service within a reasonable time, specify the efforts exerted to locate the petitioners, or state that the summons was served on a person of sufficient age and discretion. Based on this service, the trial court declared the petitioners in default on December 29, 1989, and rendered a judgment by default on January 24, 1990. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on February 26, 1990, challenging the validity of the service of summons and the court’s jurisdiction over their persons. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioners’ subsequent petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction. The petitioners then elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners through the substituted service of summons effected by Deputy Sheriff Cruz.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners because the substituted service of summons was invalid. The general rule is that summons must be personally served. Substituted service is allowed only if personal service cannot be effected within a reasonable time, and such impossibility must be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. The sheriff’s return in this case was patently defective as it did not indicate the impossibility of personal service within a reasonable time, specify the efforts exerted to locate the petitioners, or state that the summons was served on a person of sufficient age and discretion. Deputy Sheriff Cruz resorted to substituted service on his first and only attempt without making earnest efforts to effect personal service, such as inquiring about the petitioners’ whereabouts or the time they were expected to return. Since the service was invalid and the petitioners did not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, the order of default, the judgment by default, the writ of execution, and the auction sale of the petitioners’ properties levied on execution were all declared null and void. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, including the valid service of summons.