G.R. No. L-27347 and L-24901, April 28, 1969.
JOSE D. VILLEGAS and RIZALINA SANTOS RIVERA, oppositors-appellants, vs. AL FERNANDO, ANGUSTIA IBAY, JUSTO IBAY and VALENTIN BUENVIAJE, ET AL., petitioners-appellees. (and) JOSE MIRANDA SAMPEDRO and PEDRO MANAHAN, applicants-appellants, vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.

FACTS

On October 27, 1959, the heirs of Jose Miranda Sampedro and Leocadio Manahan (appellants-heirs) petitioned the Court of First Instance of Rizal, acting as a land registration court, to approve an amended plan (Psu-697-Amd) for a parcel of land in Macabud Montalban, Rizal, and to direct the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of registration for Lot No. 1. They based their petition on a copy of a Court of Appeals decision dated November 26, 1938, which allegedly affirmed a lower court’s award of the lot to the original applicants, with the modification that one-sixth belonged to spouses Jose Villegas and Irene Santos. The lower court, noting no objection from the Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forestry, issued an order on December 2, 1959, approving the plan and directing the issuance of a decree. Decree No. N-75048 was issued on December 22, 1959, and transcribed as Original Certificate of Title No. 2180 on December 24, 1959.
Within one year, several persons (petitioners-appellees) filed petitions for review under Section 38 of Act No. 496 , claiming their interests were prejudiced by the undue inclusion of their lands in Lot No. 1 and alleging fraud in procuring the decree. They prayed for the reopening and annulment of the decree and title. The appellants-heirs moved to dismiss these petitions, arguing some petitioners’ properties were not included and others were mere homestead or free patent applicants without legal personality to question the decree. On July 26, 1961, the lower court denied the motion to dismiss, opining that homestead applicants were included in the phrase “any person deprived of… interest therein” in Section 38.
Subsequently, it was discovered that the copy of the Court of Appeals decision submitted was a certified copy from the Land Registration Commission, which itself was copied from a Bureau of Lands copy, and the original record and decision were allegedly lost or destroyed during World War II. This prompted some petitioners-appellees to file separate petitions in March 1963 to set aside the December 2, 1959 order, contending the lower court had no jurisdiction because the existence of the Court of Appeals decision was doubtful, it was unenforceable due to prescription, and it had not been properly reconstituted under Act No. 3110 . The appellants-heirs opposed, arguing the order was final and executed, Act No. 3110 was inapplicable, and the record was virtually reconstituted by the issuance of the order.
On August 23, 1963, the lower court set aside its December 2, 1959 order, invoking lack of authority due to the non-reconstitution of the case record and the Court of Appeals decision. The appellants-heirs moved for reconsideration, and Jose Villegas and Rizalina Santos Rivera (heir of Irene Santos) appeared, petitioning to set aside the August 23, 1963 order for lack of notice. Both were denied on April 11, 1964. The appellants-heirs appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Villegas and Rivera appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified their case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1. Whether the appeal from the order denying the motion to dismiss the petitions for review (dated July 26, 1961) is proper.
2. Whether the lower court erred in setting aside its December 2, 1959 order (directing issuance of the decree) on the ground that the registration case record and the Court of Appeals decision were not reconstituted under Act No. 3110 .

RULING

1. The appeal from the order dated July 26, 1961, denying the motion to dismiss the petitions for review, is dismissed for being premature. This order is interlocutory, as there was no trial or decision on the merits of the petitions for review. The proper procedure is to continue with the trial and, if the decision is adverse, to raise the issue on appeal. The Supreme Court declined to rule on whether homestead or free patent applicants are included under Section 38 of Act No. 496 at this stage, as the lower court must first settle the unresolved status and rights of the parties.
2. The lower court did not err in setting aside its December 2, 1959 order. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders dated August 23, 1963, and April 11, 1964. The contention that Act No. 3110 does not apply because the registration case was no longer pending but finally decided in 1938 is untenable. Under Section 9 of Act No. 3110 , registration proceedings are considered pending until the issuance of the decree of registration. Since the decree here was issued only on December 22, 1959, the proceedings were still pending when the records were destroyed during the war and required reconstitution under Act No. 3110 . The lower court correctly held it had no authority to issue the December 2, 1959 order without proper reconstitution.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed orders of August 23, 1963, and April 11, 1964. The records were remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. Costs were imposed in solidum on the appellants in both cases.