GR 204745; (December, 2014) (Digest)
G.R. No. 204745 , December 8, 2014
Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership, Petitioner, vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership, a VAT-registered entity engaged in generating electricity, filed its quarterly VAT returns for 2008, reflecting unutilized input VAT of ₱6,149,256.25. On December 28, 2009, it filed an administrative claim for refund/credit of this amount with the BIR. On March 30, 2010 (107 days later), it filed a judicial claim for refund for the first quarter of 2008 (₱1,624,603.33) with the CTA, docketed as CTA Case No. 8082. On May 27, 2010, it filed a separate judicial claim for the remaining quarters. The CIR moved to dismiss CTA Case No. 8082, arguing it was filed prematurely for non-compliance with the mandatory 120-day waiting period under Section 112(D) of the NIRC, as interpreted in CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. The CTA Second Division and the CTA En Banc granted the motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction due to premature filing.
ISSUE
Whether the CTA En Banc correctly affirmed the dismissal of petitioner’s judicial claim for refund/credit of input VAT in CTA Case No. 8082 for being prematurely filed.
RULING
No. The petition is granted. The CTA En Banc’s decision is reversed and set aside, and CTA Case No. 8082 is remanded to the CTA Second Division for resolution on the merits. While the general rule, as established in Aichi, requires strict observance of the 120-day period as a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite, an exception exists based on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated December 10, 2003. This ruling, which created a valid claim for equitable estoppel under Section 246 of the NIRC, stated that a taxpayer need not wait for the 120-day period to lapse before filing a judicial claim. As clarified in Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR, this exception applied during the period from December 10, 2003, to October 6, 2010 (the date of the Aichi promulgation). Since petitioner filed its judicial claim on March 30, 2010, within this exceptional period, it was not required to wait for the full 120 days, and its filing was timely. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination on the merits, as the entitlement to the refund involves questions of fact not reviewable under Rule 45.