GR L 27348; (July, 1969) (Digest)

G.R. No. L-27348 July 29, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MIGUEL MENDEZ, ET AL., defendants, MIGUEL MENDEZ and SEGUNDO GIANAN, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

Appellants Miguel Mendez and Segundo Gianan were among several persons accused of slander by deed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Virac, Catanduanes. The proceedings were characterized by numerous postponements and continuances initiated by both the prosecution and the defense for various reasons, including the parties’ absences, illnesses, and procedural questions. After multiple delays, trial commenced on October 10, 1962. On January 3, 1963, the prosecution rested its case. The defense manifested its intent to file a motion to dismiss via a memorandum, and the court granted them until January 14 to submit it, warning that failure to do so would result in the case being deemed submitted for decision, with the trial definitely set for January 23. No memorandum was filed. On January 23, appellants were absent. Their counsel moved for a continuance, claiming Mendez was in Manila with a medical certificate and Gianan was suddenly ill, and that no notice was sent to the bondsmen. The court, noting the case had been dragging on and the prior warning, denied the motion as a dilatory subterfuge and deemed the case submitted for decision based on the prosecution’s evidence. The court convicted Mendez and Gianan, sentencing them to a fine of P250.00 each, damages, and costs. On March 15, 1963, the judgment was promulgated, but only Gianan was present; Mendez was absent without a valid reason, merely receiving a copy of the decision. Both appealed, arguing denial of due process and abuse of discretion in denying the continuance, and that the promulgation as to Mendez was unlawful.

ISSUE

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the appellants’ motion for continuance, thereby denying them due process by considering the case submitted for decision without receiving their evidence.
2. Whether the promulgation of judgment was valid as to appellant Miguel Mendez, who was absent during promulgation.

RULING

1. No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for continuance. The granting or refusal of such motions lies within the sound discretion of the court, guided by the ends of justice and the right to a speedy trial. The lower court had been excessively liberal in granting previous postponements. Appellants were duly notified of the January 23 hearing and were warned of the consequences of further delay. Their excuses for absence were flimsy and indicative of dilatory tactics. The court’s denial, based on a well-founded belief that the application was merely intended to delay, did not constitute a denial of due process. The appellants had the opportunity to be heard but forfeited it through their own fault.
2. No, the promulgation of judgment was not valid as to appellant Miguel Mendez. Under the old Rules of Court (Rule 116, Section 6), the defendant’s personal presence during the promulgation of judgment for a less grave felony (which this was, as the penalty was a fine of P250.00) is mandatory. Mendez’s absence rendered the promulgation ineffective as to him. Therefore, the case must be remanded for proper promulgation of the judgment to Mendez. The judgment of conviction itself is affirmed.
The appealed judgment is affirmed, but the case is ordered remanded to the Justice of the Peace Court of Virac for promulgation and reading of the sentence to accused Miguel Mendez as required by law. Appellant Segundo Gianan shall pay one-half of the costs.