G.R. No. RTJ-91-752 June 23, 1993
Senior State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño, Sr., complainant, vs. Hon. Baltazar Dizon, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 113, Pasay City, respondent.

FACTS

Senior State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño, Sr., Chairman of Task Force NAIA, filed an administrative complaint against Judge Baltazar R. Dizon for “Gross Ignorance of the Law” due to his acquittal of the defendants in four cases of illegal possession of firearms. The accused were arrested at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) for attempting to smuggle firearms. The cases were: Criminal Case No. 91-0464-P (People vs. Adolf Werner Borchert), Criminal Case No. 91-0586 (People vs. Nelson S. Leonor), Criminal Case No. 91-0881 (People vs. Robert Wayne Wilkins), and Criminal Case No. 90-5860 (People vs. Elizabeth Vicky Nua). In acquitting Borchert, Judge Dizon ruled that the information failed to allege that the firearm was used or there was intent to use it in an offense, and that the possession was temporary and incidental. In the Wilkins case, he granted a motion to quash the information on similar grounds, despite a prosecution motion for reconsideration arguing that the cited case (People vs. Asuncion) was inapplicable as it involved an amnesty period. The Investigating Justice found that Judge Dizon ignored settled jurisprudence that illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 is a malum prohibitum offense where criminal intent is not necessary, and that the law punishes mere possession without license.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Judge Baltazar Dizon is administratively liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law for acquitting the accused in the four illegal possession of firearms cases based on an erroneous interpretation that the law requires an allegation and proof of intent to use the firearm in an offense.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court found respondent Judge Baltazar Dizon guilty of gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. The Court held that illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 is a malum prohibitum offense where mere possession without license constitutes the crime, and criminal intent is not an essential element. Judge Dizon’s insistence on requiring proof of “animus possidendi” or intent to use the firearm in an offense was a blatant disregard of settled jurisprudence. His erroneous rulings, repeated in four cases, demonstrated not only ignorance but also intransigence and persistence in error, which eroded public faith in the judiciary. Considering this was his second offense, the Court imposed the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service. The decision is immediately executory.