GR 106646; (June, 1993) (Digest)
G.R. No. 106646 June 30, 1993
Jaime Ledesma, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, respondents.
FACTS
On August 21, 1980, private respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation filed a case (Case No. 38287) in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against petitioner Jaime Ledesma to enforce a Trust Receipt Agreement executed on April 1, 1974. The case was dismissed without prejudice on March 3, 1981, as summons could not be served on Ledesma. On December 2, 1988, the bank filed a second case (Civil Case No. 88-2572) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati on the same cause of action. Ledesma moved to dismiss on the ground of prescription. The trial court denied the motion and rendered judgment in favor of the bank, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Ledesma’s petition for review on certiorari was initially denied by the Supreme Court, prompting this motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE
Whether the filing of the first action (Case No. 38287) interrupted the prescriptive period such that the full ten-year period commenced anew upon the dismissal of that case, thereby making the second action (Civil Case No. 88-2572) timely filed.
RULING
The Supreme Court DENIED the motion for reconsideration with finality. It held that under Article 1155 of the Civil Code, the prescription of actions is interrupted by the filing of an action. Following the doctrinal pronouncements in Overseas Bank of Manila vs. Geraldez and Philippine National Railways vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court ruled that the correct interpretation of “interruption” means that the prescriptive period starts to run anew from the cessation of the interruption (i.e., from the finality of the dismissal of the first case). The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that the prescriptive period is merely tolled, which would only allow the balance of the remaining period for filing a subsequent action. The Court found this bifurcated interpretation irrational, as it would mean a judicial action produces a lesser effect than a mere extrajudicial demand or written acknowledgment of debt, which are also modes of interruption under the same Article 1155. Consequently, the second action was not barred by prescription.