G.R. No. 106895 September 10, 1993
ELVIRA F. VALENZONA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, TWELFTH DIVISION, HON. TEOFILO R. REDUBLA, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Branch 14, Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial District, Baybay, Leyte, and heirs of JOSEFA DIPAY, namely, VICENTE TRIPOLI, DULCISIMA TRIPOLI PILAPIL in their behalf, and in behalf of BONIFACIA TRIPOLI BASCO, PRESENTACION TRIPOLI MONTERDE, CORNELIO TRIPOLI, ELIZABETH TRIPOLI LOPEZ, JULITA TRIPOLI CASUGAY, LEONORA TRIPOLI, RICARDO TRIPOLI, JR., and RUNICO TRIPOLI, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondents (heirs of Josefa Dipay) filed a complaint for recovery of inheritance and real property with damages against petitioner Elvira Flores Valenzona and others. The RTC rendered a decision on June 30, 1988, declaring Lots 11070 and 11071 as part of the conjugal partnership of spouses Ricardo Tripoli and Josefa Dipay, and upon Josefa’s death, a co-ownership of Ricardo and his ten children (the private respondents). It declared Ricardo Tripoli’s deed of sale of the lots to Alexander Flores and Alicia Flores (and subsequently to petitioner Elvira Flores Valenzona) valid only as to Ricardo’s ideal share (4.5222 hectares). It ordered partition, with 10/22 to the plaintiffs (private respondents) and 12/22 to the defendants-spouses (petitioner). It also ordered the defendants to render an accounting of the pecuniary value of the produce from the area adjudicated to the plaintiffs from January 1979 until delivery, giving 60% thereof to the plaintiffs. The judgment became final and executory. A writ of execution was issued. A commissioner on accounting was appointed, who submitted a report finding that petitioner possessed the land from 1979 until May 15, 1987, when private respondent Vicente Tripoli forcibly took possession. The commissioner’s summary showed plaintiffs were entitled to P79,409.41 and defendants to P52,941.61 for the period 1979-1987. The trial court, after petitioner’s counsel failed to comment on objections to the report, considered the incident closed based on the commissioner’s findings. The court issued alias writs of execution. Petitioner filed motions to quash, arguing a change in the situation of the parties (the private respondents’ forcible possession since May 15, 1987) rendered execution inequitable. The trial court denied these motions. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed it, finding no grave abuse of discretion. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the respondent Judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders denying the motion to quash the alias writ of execution, despite petitioner’s claim of a change in the situation of the parties (private respondents’ forcible possession of the land) making execution inequitable.

RULING

Yes, the Court of Appeals is correct. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision. The rule is that once a judgment is final and executory, the issuance of a writ of execution is a ministerial duty. An exception exists where there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable. However, this exception cannot be invoked when the supposed change took place while the case was still pending, as there was an opportunity to bring it to the court’s attention. Here, the alleged forcible taking by private respondents occurred on May 15, 1987, while the main case (Civil Case No. B-778) was still pending, as the RTC decision was rendered on June 30, 1988. Petitioner did not bring this matter to the trial court’s attention during the pendency of the case. Furthermore, under Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment or order directing an accounting shall not be stayed after its rendition and before or during an appeal. With more reason, such a judgment cannot be stayed after it has become final and executory. Therefore, the respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders for execution. The petition was denied.