G.R. No. L-31687 February 26, 1970
NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. CITY MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Navarro sought a permit from respondent City Mayor Antonio J. Villegas to hold a public assembly. The respondent Mayor did not absolutely deny the permit but did not grant it unconditionally for the requested location (Plaza Miranda). Instead, the Mayor expressed a policy of not issuing permits for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies on weekdays, citing the greater interest of the general public and a desire not to unduly disturb community life based on lessons from past events. He offered to grant permits for assemblies at Plaza Miranda on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, and alternatively offered the Sunken Gardens as the site for the demonstration. The Mayor’s appraisal was that a rally at Plaza Miranda posed a clearer and more imminent danger of public disorder, breaches of peace, criminal acts, and bloodshed compared to one at Sunken Gardens, and that such assemblies placed the community in a state of fear and tension disrupting normal activities.

ISSUE

Whether or not the respondent Mayor’s refusal to grant an unconditional permit for an assembly at Plaza Miranda, and his offer of an alternative site and time, constitutes a valid exercise of discretion justifying the denial of the writ sought by the petitioner.

RULING

The Court DENIED the writ prayed for and dismissed the petition. The ruling was based on the following considerations: 1) The respondent Mayor did not absolutely deny the permit but exercised his reasonable discretion, as recognized in Primicias v. Fugoso, to specify the streets or public places to be used for an assembly to secure convenient use by others and provide proper policing. 2) The Mayor offered to grant permits for Plaza Miranda on weekends and holidays and offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative site. 3) The Court found no reason to disbelieve the Mayor’s appraisal that a rally at Plaza Miranda posed a clearer and more imminent danger of public disorder, especially since petitioner manifested it had no means of preventing such disorders. 4) Such assemblies caused general public detriment by creating fear, tension, and disruption. 5) Civil rights and liberties exist only in an orderly society. 6) Petitioner failed to show a clear, specific legal duty on the part of the Mayor to grant the application unconditionally.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
* Concurring (Villamor, J.): The right to assembly is not absolute. The Mayor did not refuse the permit but offered a reasonable alternative. There was no arbitrary refusal, so the petitioner was not entitled to the writ.
* Dissenting (Castro and Fernando, JJ.): The right to freedom of assembly is entitled to utmost deference. The grounds for the Mayor’s refusal—as stated in his letter citing a temporary policy for the “greater interest of the general public”—did not meet the objective standards required by Primicias v. Fugoso. This constituted an impermissible prior restraint on a constitutional right, analogous to the standard cited from Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham where a licensing ordinance without narrow, objective, and definite standards is unconstitutional.