G.R. No. 97307 October 3, 1993
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Manuel Dusohan y Borja, accused-appellant.

FACTS

The accused-appellant, Manuel Dusohan y Borja, was charged with the rape of his daughter, Mariel Dusohan y Gresola, by force, intimidation, and moral ascendancy from July 1990 to August 8, 1990, in Marikina, Metro Manila. After quarreling with his wife in October 1989, appellant left the conjugal home, and his daughter Mariel followed to live with him. The trial court found that between October 23 and 30, 1989, at around 9:00 P.M., appellant entered Mariel’s room, undressed and kissed her, pinned her down, and had carnal knowledge against her will, threatening to kill her if she disclosed the incident. These sexual assaults were repeated weekly until January 1990. In July 1990, after Mariel returned to appellant’s house upon his promise to stop the abuses, the assaults resumed about 20 times that month. On August 8, 1990, while Mariel was ill, appellant again sexually assaulted her. Mariel eventually reported the abuses to her mother and then to the police. Appellant pleaded not guilty but was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of rape with the aggravating circumstance of relationship and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and indemnity of P30,000.

ISSUE

The issues raised on appeal are: (1) whether the conviction was erroneous due to lack of resistance by the complainant; (2) whether the crime of rape requires consummated carnal knowledge with force or intimidation; (3) whether the complainant consented to the sexual intercourse; and (4) whether the complainant was coerced by her mother to file the rape case to effect a separation.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction with modification. It held that: (1) the law does not impose on the rape victim the burden of proving resistance; it is sufficient that the prosecution proves the victim’s will to resist was overpowered by the accused. Appellant exercised strong moral ascendancy and parental control over his daughter, making force and intimidation unnecessary to be of the same degree as in cases without filial relations. (2) The claim of consent was rejected as “sick, sick, sick”; Mariel’s surrender to superior force was not consent, as she pleaded with her father to stop. (3) The claim that Mariel was coerced by her mother to file the case was unbelievable, as a mother would not sacrifice her daughter’s virtue for such a purpose, especially if the mother was at fault as claimed by appellant. (4) Appellant’s defense of alibi was untenable after he admitted to having carnal knowledge with his daughter. Relationship was correctly considered aggravating. The Court increased the indemnity to P50,000.00, deeming the offense heinous and highly offensive to the moral sense of the community. The decision of the trial court was affirmed with the modification on indemnity.