G.R. No. L-106528 December 21, 1993
PHILIPPINE COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE DOMINGO D. PANIS as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, THE HONORABLE RICARDO DIAZ, as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, the CITY OF MANILA, ANTONIO GONZALES, JR., KARLO BUTIONG, LEONARDO AQUINO, EDILBERTO LOPEZ, ANTILANO FERRER, LEONCIA DAVILLO JAMERO, LUIS FERNANDEZ, PATRICIO DE GUZMAN, RICARDO DE LEON, VIRGILIO TORNERO, FAUSTO FERNANDEZ, DOMINGO MEREN, EDUARDA JACINTO, MAGDALENA VELEZ, LUSITO ALMADRONES, MYRNA BARREDO EBREO, FULGENCIO CORSINO, PEDRO VELASQUEZ, JUAN INOBAYA, NENITA ARCE, MAGNO ORTINEZ, ARMANDO PARAGAS, HIPOLITO ESTABILLO, FELICIANO FAUSTINO, VIRGILIO EDIC, JOSE TINGZON, JOSUE MARIANO, MARIA YERO, MA. DOLORES QUIZON, ISIDERO TAGUILIG, CIRIACO MENDOZA, JUAN ROMERO, JOSE LAGATA, FRUCTUSO PUSING, TEOFILO TERSOL, ANTONIO LACHICA, PIO RAJALES, REGINA VIERNES, JUAN ROMERO, DOMINGO EDIC, EDUARDA GONZALES, PABLO QUIRANTE, LEONORA SANTIA, MARIA RIVERA, ELENA ARCE, LAZARO GOMEZ, PEDRO MENDOZA, DOMINADOR ADAO, JUAN PANTERA, FRISCA MANDOT, SOCORRO SANTOS AND GLORIA JEBUNAN, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Philippine Columbian Association is a non-stock, non-profit corporation that owns a 4,842.90 square meter parcel of land in Paco, Manila, adjacent to its facilities. Private respondents are the actual occupants of this lot. In 1982, petitioner successfully instituted ejectment proceedings against the occupants, with the judgment becoming final after affirmance by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 85262. Upon petitioner’s motion, the Metropolitan Trial Court issued a writ of demolition on May 30, 1990. To prevent their ejectment and the demolition of their houses, private respondents filed a petition for injunction (Civil Case No. 90-53346) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Manila. Subsequently, on June 28, 1990, the City of Manila filed a complaint for expropriation of the same lot (Civil Case No. 90-53531) before RTC, Branch 41, Manila. Petitioner moved to dismiss the expropriation complaint, arguing the City had no power to expropriate, the purpose was not for public use, it was politically motivated, and the P2 million provisional deposit was insufficient and based on an unconstitutional law (P.D. 1533). The RTC, Branch 41, denied the motion to dismiss, issued an order of condemnation, and later granted the City’s ex-parte motion for a writ of possession. Meanwhile, RTC, Branch 27, granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the private respondents in the injunction case. Petitioner’s petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing these orders, was denied. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE

The primary issues are: (1) Whether the City of Manila has the power to expropriate private property; (2) Whether the expropriation of the subject lot is for a public use; and (3) Whether petitioner was denied due process.

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition for lack of merit.
1. The City of Manila has the express power to expropriate private property. Its Revised Charter, R.A. No. 409 , Section 3, grants it the general power to “condemn private property for public use.” Furthermore, Section 100 specifically authorizes the City to “acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide the same into home lots for sale” to bona fide tenants, occupants, laborers, and low-salaried employees, and expressly allows acquisition “through expropriation proceedings.”
2. The expropriation is for a public use. The concept of public use has evolved to include urban land reform and housing, which provide indirect public benefit or advantage. The fact that the program benefits only a specific group (the occupants and other qualified beneficiaries) does not negate its public character. The 1987 Constitution , in Article XIII, Section 9, recognizes the state’s role in undertaking urban land reform and housing. The size of the property (less than half a hectare) is not a bar to expropriation.
3. Petitioner was not denied due process. Although its motion to dismiss was not set for hearing, petitioner did not raise this issue before the trial and appellate courts and only raised it on appeal. Due process was afforded when petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying its motion to dismiss. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals passed upon the same issues raised in the motion to dismiss. Regarding the provisional value, the amount of P2 million was fixed by the court and accepted by both parties, and petitioner is estopped from assailing it. This valuation is merely provisional, and just compensation will be definitively determined in the second stage of the expropriation proceedings.