GR 106105; (April, 1994) (Digest)
G.R. No. 106105 April 21, 1994.
CATALINO, ZOILO, FELISA and LUISA, ALL SURNAMED DAVAC, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EPIFANIO, PAULO, ANTONIO and GREGORIO ALL SURNAMED FULLANTE, respondents.
FACTS
On July 7, 1983, petitioners filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership of Real Property against private respondents. On December 22, 1986, a Compromise Agreement was submitted for the trial court’s approval. The Agreement was signed by petitioner Catalino Davac “in his own right and in representation of his co-plaintiffs” and by their counsel, and by private respondent Paulo Fullante “in his own right and in representation of his co-defendants” and by their counsel. The trial court approved the Agreement in a Decision dated January 2, 1987. Subsequently, the trial court issued orders to implement the Decision, including commissioning geodetic engineers to survey the subject lots. On November 26, 1990, private respondents’ new counsel filed a Motion to Declare Null and Void the Compromise Agreement and the Decision, alleging Paulo Fullante had no power of attorney to sign for the other respondents. Petitioners opposed, arguing the Agreement was merely unenforceable and had been ratified by the respondents’ subsequent conduct. On March 7, 1991, the trial court declared its Decision “unenforceable against the defendants Epifanio Fullante, Antonio Fullante and Edgardo Fullante.” Petitioners did not appeal this Order. Instead, on June 17, 1991, they filed a Motion to Declare Judgment by Compromise Ratified, which the trial court denied. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals held the March 7, 1991 Order was a final order, and since petitioners did not appeal it, it became final and unalterable. It further ruled that certiorari under Rule 65 was not the proper remedy to correct errors of judgment, which should have been raised by appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners’ petition for certiorari, which sought to set aside the trial court’s Orders declaring the compromise judgment unenforceable and denying the motion to declare it ratified.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal. The trial court’s Order dated March 7, 1991, which declared the Decision based on the Compromise Agreement unenforceable against three of the private respondents, was a final order that disposed of the action as to those parties. Petitioners did not appeal this final order within the reglementary period; thus, it attained finality and became unalterable. The subsequent Motion to Declare Judgment by Compromise Ratified filed by petitioners was an indirect attempt to assail this final Order, which the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to entertain. The proper remedy against the final Order of March 7, 1991 was an appeal, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal and lies only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.
