G.R. No. L-4855, L-4964, L-5102; October 11, 1951
JOSE M. NAVA ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. MAGNO GATMAITAN, ETC., respondent. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, ETC., respondent. EUGENIO ANGELES, ETC., petitioner, vs. HON. GAVINO S. ABAYA, ETC., respondent.

FACTS

On October 22, 1950, President Elpidio Quirino issued Proclamation No. 210, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for persons detained for the crimes of sedition, insurrection, or rebellion, and other crimes committed in furtherance thereof. This was prompted by the apprehension of 100 alleged leading members of lawless elements engaged in subversive acts. The suspension aimed to allow prosecuting officials sufficient time to investigate and file necessary charges, and to avoid liability under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code for failing to deliver a detained person to judicial authorities within six hours. Subsequently, several individuals covered by the proclamation were formally charged in court by information for rebellion with multiple murder, arson, and robberies. Petitioners in these consolidated cases sought bail. The respondent judges in the Hernandez (Montesa) and Nava (Gatmaitan) cases denied bail, while the respondent judge in the Angeles (Abaya) case granted bail to the accused without giving the prosecution an opportunity to present evidence on the strength of the evidence of guilt.

ISSUE

Whether a person, formally indicted in court for rebellion (a non-capital offense) after being detained under a presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, is entitled to bail.

RULING

Yes. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail are separate and co-equal guarantees under the Bill of Rights. The Constitution limits suspension to the privilege of the writ alone, leaving other rights, including the right to bail, inviolable. The crime of rebellion is not a capital offense, as it is penalized only by prision mayor and a fine. Therefore, under the Constitution, all persons charged with non-capital offenses, such as rebellion, are bailable before conviction. Once a person is formally charged in court by information, their detention is by virtue of a judicial commitment, not an executive one under the proclamation. At that point, the purpose of the proclamation has been accomplished as to them, and they are to be dealt with according to constitutional and legal processes. The court, in acting on a bail petition, does not inquire into the cause of detention under the proclamation but exercises its judicial power. To hold otherwise would allow the suspension to operate as a judgment of conviction, violating due process. The ruling in the Abaya case (G.R. No. L-5102) is applied in principle, recognizing the right to bail for persons charged with rebellion. However, for charges that include capital offenses (like murder), the prosecution must be given an opportunity to show that evidence of guilt is strong before bail can be granted.