G.R. No. L-3777 and L-3778; October 31, 1951
Valentina Zamora and Bonifacio Diones, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Tomas Medran et al., defendants-appellants. (G.R. No. L-3777)

Tomas Medran, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Bonifacio Diones, defendant-appellant. (G.R. No. L-3778)

FACTS

In November 1945, the Court of First Instance of Mindoro rendered a consolidated judgment in two cases declaring Tomas Medran the owner of a 2.5-hectare land and ordering Bonifacio Diones to vacate the land, return it to Medran, and pay Medran the sum of P1,000 as damages and the costs of the two cases. The judgment could not be enforced until December 1949 due to dilatory steps taken by Diones. Upon Medran’s petition, the clerk of court issued an order of execution which included the P1,000 damages, P89.25 costs, and interest at six percent from May 17, 1941. Diones objected to the payment of interest, deposited the sum of P1,089.52 (covering damages and costs only) with the clerk of court, and raised the question of his liability to pay interest via an appropriate motion. The Court of First Instance of Mindoro upheld Diones’s objection. Tomas Medran appealed this order.

ISSUE

Whether the writ of execution can include the collection of interest on the monetary award (damages and costs) when the dispositive part of the final and executory judgment does not provide for such interest.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance, ruling that the writ of execution cannot include the collection of interest. The writ of execution must conform strictly to the dispositive part of the judgment to be executed. Since the dispositive part of the November 1945 judgment ordered Diones to pay P1,000 as damages and the costs but did not include any award of interest, the sheriff is guided solely by that dispositive part. There is no statute directing that legal interest shall necessarily be collected in the execution of judgments for money. Rule 39, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, which mentions satisfying the “judgment with interest,” is merely a procedural outline for the sheriff and does not automatically grant interest; it presupposes interest has been ordered by the judgment. Rule 53, Section 6, which provides for interest on judgments rendered by the Court of Appeals, is a principle of adjudication for appellate courts and is not self-executing for lower court judgments. The appealed order disallowing the collection of interest was affirmed, with costs against appellant Tomas Medran.