G.R. No. L-5606; August 28, 1952
SIMPLICIO PENDON, petitioner-appellant, vs. JULITO DIASNES, respondent-appellee.

FACTS

This is a quo warranto proceeding. Simplicio Pendon sought to have Julito Diasnes declared ineligible for the office of municipal mayor of Dumangas, Iloilo, to which Diasnes was elected in November 1951. The ground for ineligibility was Diasnes’s previous conviction for estafa in 1932, for which he was sentenced to one year and one day of imprisonment, fully served and extinguished by his release on September 25, 1933. Diasnes alleged he had been granted an absolute pardon by the Governor General in 1934. The original pardon and copies were unavailable, having been destroyed during the war or burned in his house by Japanese forces. Secondary evidence of the pardon’s existence and contents was presented through depositions and testimonies, which the trial court found sufficient and credible.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the respondent, Julito Diasnes, despite his prior conviction for estafa, is eligible to hold the office of municipal mayor, considering his claim of having received an absolute pardon. This involves the admissibility and sufficiency of the secondary evidence proving the pardon and the legal effect of such a pardon on the disqualification arising from his conviction under the relevant election law.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, upholding Diasnes’s eligibility. The Court held:
1. The secondary evidence presented to prove the lost pardon was admissible and sufficient. The foundational proof of the unavailability of the original and copies due to wartime destruction was competent, allowing for testimonial evidence regarding the pardon’s nature and contents. The trial court’s factual findings on this matter were conclusive, as the appeal raised only questions of law.
2. An absolute pardon removes all disabilities resulting from a conviction. The Court, interpreting Section 99 of Republic Act No. 180 (as amended), reconciled paragraphs (a) and (b). It ruled that paragraph (b), which disqualifies persons convicted of crimes against property, qualifies only the first exception in paragraph (a) (regarding sentences of less than one year). It does not limit the second exception in paragraph (a), which restores political rights through a plenary pardon. Therefore, an absolute pardon restores the right to vote (and by extension, eligibility for office) for any crime, including crimes against property, if the sentence was one year or more. Since Diasnes was sentenced to more than one year for estafa and claimed an absolute pardon, such pardon removed his disqualification.
3. The Court rejected the appellant’s interpretation, noting it would lead to absurd results where a person convicted of a minor property crime could never vote even if pardoned, while a person convicted of a heinous crime could have rights restored by pardon. The legislative intent was to require a pardon to restore rights for all major crimes (sentences of one year or more, regardless of type) and for minor crimes (sentences of less than one year) only if they are crimes against property, due to the element of dishonesty involved in such petty offenses.