GR L 4164; (December, 1952) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-4164 December 12, 1952
In the matter of the petition of Antonio Infante for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ANTONIO INFANTE, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent-appellant.
FACTS
Antonio Infante was convicted of murder and sentenced to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal, commencing service on June 21, 1927. On March 6, 1939, after serving 15 years, 7 months, and 11 days, he was granted a conditional pardon and released. The condition was that “he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.” On April 25, 1949, Infante was convicted by the Municipal Court of Bacolod City for driving a jeep without a license and sentenced to pay a fine of P10. On July 13, 1950, the Executive Secretary ordered Infante’s re-arrest and recommitment to serve the unexpired portion (1 year and 11 days) of his original sentence for breach of the pardon condition, pursuant to section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code. Infante filed a petition for habeas corpus, which was granted by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. The Provincial Fiscal appealed.
ISSUE
1. Whether section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, authorizing the President to order the recommitment of a violator of a conditional pardon, had been abrogated.
2. Whether the unserved penalty (1 year and 11 days) for which Infante was recommitted had prescribed.
3. Whether the condition of the pardon was still operative when Infante committed the violation of the Motor Vehicle Law in 1949.
RULING
1. No, section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code was not abrogated. The Court, citing Sales vs. Director of Prisons, held that the legislative intent was to preserve the President’s power under section 64(i) notwithstanding the enactment of Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. The two provisions can stand together, and action under one does not preclude action under the other.
2. No, the penalty had not prescribed. Under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, prescription of penalties commences from the date the culprit evades service of his sentence. There was no evasion in this case. Even if there were, computation could not start earlier than the date of the order for rearrest.
3. No, the condition of the pardon was no longer operative when Infante committed the violation in 1949. The Court adopted a rule of strict construction in favor of the grantee for conditional pardons. Since the pardon did not state the time within which the condition was to be observed, its duration was limited to the period of the prisoner’s original sentence (which ended in 1944), unless an intention to extend it beyond that time was manifest. Construing it to last a lifetime would be oppressive, especially for a minor misdemeanor committed over ten years after release. The Court also considered that Infante had exhibited excellent conduct during confinement, his release could have been a reward, and recommitment after such a long period would be repugnant to reason and the spirit of penal laws. The judgment of the lower court granting the writ of habeas corpus was affirmed.