GR 105997; (October, 1997) (Digest)
G.R. No. 105997 September 26, 1997
SPOUSES MARIO AND CARMELITA BELLA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION and BEN MEDINA alias “BEN UNTOG,” respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Mario Bella purchased an Isuzu Gemini car from GM Automart Corporation on April 27, 1978, signing a Deed of Sale with Chattel Mortgage, a Promissory Note, and a Disclosure of Loan/Credit Transaction for P53,390.88, payable in 36 monthly installments. The promissory note stipulated a 3% monthly penalty and 20% attorney’s fees in case of default. GM Automart assigned its rights to respondent Industrial Finance Corporation (IFC). Petitioner made fourteen installment payments from August 26, 1978, to October 18, 1979, but subsequently defaulted. By December 25, 1979, the amount due was P32,834.60. After demands, IFC filed a complaint for a sum of money against the spouses Bella, who then filed a third-party complaint against Benjamin Untog. The trial court ruled in favor of IFC, ordering petitioners to pay P25,212.30 with a 2% monthly penalty and attorney’s fees, and dismissed the third-party complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed but modified the award to P32,725.61, still subject to a 2% monthly penalty.
ISSUE
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in modifying the monetary award despite IFC not appealing the trial court’s decision.
2. Whether IFC’s one-day late filing of its answer to a written request for admission is fatal to its case.
3. Whether the Court of Appeals committed a misapprehension of facts in not finding the third-party defendant liable.
RULING
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. It held:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the award. The size of the award is an issue that does not affect the court’s jurisdiction, nor is it a plain or clerical error. Since IFC did not appeal, the appellate court had no power to resolve it. The trial court’s computation, though based on an erroneous premise of uniform monthly payments, stands. Thus, the award is reverted to P25,212.30.
2. No. The one-day delay in filing the answer to the request for admission is a technicality that should not prevail over substantive justice. The Court emphasized that technicalities should not hinder justice, especially compared to petitioners’ own delays of almost five years in presenting evidence.
3. No. The petitioners’ liability was firmly established by the promissory note, chattel mortgage, and disclosure statement signed by Mario Bella, and his failure to dispute the demand. The assessment of IFC’s evidence as sufficient involves factual findings conclusive upon the trial court, with no justifiable reason to reverse them. The dismissal of the third-party complaint was upheld.
The Supreme Court modified the Court of Appeals decision, reinstating the trial court’s award of P25,212.30, with a 2% monthly penalty from January 8, 1980, and P4,000.00 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.