G.R. No. L-5470 April 29, 1953
WOODCRAFT WORKS, LTD., petitioner, vs. SEGUNDO C. MOSCOSO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; JOSE ABESAMIS and the SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.

FACTS

On September 13, 1951, respondent Jose Abesamis filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Leyte for rescission of a contract and damages against petitioner Woodcraft Works, Ltd. Petitioner was served with summons and a copy of the complaint on September 18, 1951. On October 1, 1951, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars. At the hearing on October 16, 1951, no one appeared for the defendant-petitioner. The plaintiff’s attorney made a verbal motion to declare the defendant in default. The court issued an order on the same day, without notifying the defendant, declaring it in default and denying its motion for a bill of particulars as filed out of time. The court then allowed plaintiff to present evidence and rendered judgment on October 29, 1951, awarding plaintiff P128,604.14. Upon learning of this, defendant filed a motion on December 13, 1951, to set aside the order and judgment, alleging they were illegal and void because it was declared in default before its time to file an answer had expired. The motion was denied, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring the petitioner in default and rendering judgment against it, considering the timeliness of its motion for a bill of particulars and the reglementary period for filing an answer.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court ruled that the petitioner’s motion for a bill of particulars, filed on October 1, 1951 (13 days after service of summons on September 18), was filed within the reglementary period. Under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a party may file such a motion “before responding to a pleading,” and the time allowed is co-extensive with the time to file an answer, which is 15 days from service of summons (Section 1, Rule 9). Since a responsive pleading was permitted, petitioner had 15 days to file the motion. Furthermore, under Section 2, Rule 16, the filing of the motion interrupted the running of the period to answer. After notice of the denial of the motion, the defendant should have the same time to serve its answer as it had when it served the motion, but not less than five days. Therefore, when the trial court declared petitioner in default on October 16, the time for filing its answer had not yet expired, as it was entitled to at least five days from notice of the denial of its motion to file its answer. The trial court thus deprived petitioner of its day in court and exceeded its jurisdiction. While certiorari generally does not lie when appeal is available, the rule was relaxed because a writ of execution had already issued and was being carried out. The judgment and orders complained of were set aside.