G.R. No. L-4433, May 29, 1953
SALUD PATENTE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMAN OMEGA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The case involves the collection of a promissory note executed by Roman Omega in favor of Salud Patente. The note, dated August 24, 1949, acknowledged a debt of P1,600.00. The terms of payment stated: “I am going to pay this debt to her, her heirs, assigns and successors, in the said sum of P1,600 in Philippine currency, as soon as possible or as soon as I have money.” The note also mentioned that the debt covered previous indebtedness and that the whole amount must be paid before the debtor could exercise his right of repurchase over a land he sold to the creditor under a pacto de retro sale. The Justice of the Peace Court rendered a decision ordering payment within four months. On appeal, the parties submitted an agreement of facts to the Court of First Instance of Leyte, stating that the promissory note had no definite term and its performance was left to the will of the debtor. The CFI declared the obligation pure and unconditional, ordering payment with interest and costs. The defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the stipulation making payment dependent on the exclusive will of the debtor (“as soon as possible or as soon as I have money”) is null and void; and if so, whether the obligation thereby becomes pure and immediately demandable, or whether the court should fix a reasonable period for payment.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance. The Court held that under Article 1115 of the Civil Code, a condition that depends exclusively upon the will of the debtor is void. However, the nullity of such a condition does not automatically convert the obligation into a pure and immediately demandable one. To do so would impose a term contrary to the original intention of the parties, which was to grant the debtor a period within which to pay. Applying Article 1128 of the Civil Code, the Court ruled that when the term has been left to the will of the debtor, or when no term has been fixed but it can be inferred that one was intended, it is the duty of the courts to fix the duration of the term. The creditor’s remedy in such a case is to file an action for the court to fix the period of payment. Consequently, the plaintiff’s action for immediate payment was premature. The case was remanded for the proper proceedings to fix the term of payment. The Court also affirmed that both the Justice of the Peace Court and the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the case.
Separate Concurring Opinion:
Justices Feria, Bengzon, and Reyes concurred in the result but expressed the view that Article 1115 of the Civil Code was inapplicable, and that the case was governed solely by Article 1128.