GR 127073 FranciSCo (Digest)
G.R. No. 127073 , January 29, 1998.
JOSE P. DANS, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. (Consolidated with G.R. No. 126995 : IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.)
FACTS
This case involves consolidated petitions arising from the Sandiganbayan’s conviction of petitioners Imelda R. Marcos and Jose P. Dans, Jr. for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The charges stemmed from lease contracts entered into by the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), where Marcos was Chairman and Dans was General Manager, with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI). The prosecution alleged these contracts were grossly disadvantageous to the government. Justice Francisco, in a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, agreed with the acquittal of Dans but dissented from the conviction of Marcos. He raised several issues regarding the proceedings, including the denial of Dans’ demurrer to evidence, a jurisdictional conflict between the Sandiganbayan’s First and Special Divisions, and the appreciation of evidence.
ISSUE
1. Whether Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is constitutional.
2. Whether the criminal informations were sufficient.
3. Whether petitioner Marcos was properly represented by counsel.
4. Whether the Sandiganbayan First Division’s decision was valid given the jurisdictional conflict with a created Special Division.
5. Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioner Dans’ demurrer to evidence.
6. Whether the evidence was properly appreciated.
7. Whether petitioner Marcos was denied a fair trial.
RULING
Justice Francisco concurred in part and dissented in part from the main Decision.
1. On the constitutionality of Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019, he concurred, finding it not a rider and germane to the law’s title as it punishes a public officer’s act of entering into a dishonest transaction, which constitutes a corrupt practice. The presumption of constitutionality was not rebutted.
2. On the sufficiency of the informations and the representation of counsel for Marcos, he concurred with the ponencia’s findings of sufficiency and proper representation.
3. On the denial of Dans’ demurrer to evidence, he dissented. He found it highly improper for the Sandiganbayan to have denied the demurrer based on the advanced testimony of defense witness Cuervo. A demurrer tests only the sufficiency of prosecution evidence, and considering defense evidence at that stage was premature and tantamount to an adjudication before the defense could fully present its case.
4. On the validity of the Sandiganbayan decision, he dissented, finding a jurisdictional fiasco. The First Division lacked unanimity, prompting the creation of a Special Division as required by P.D. 1606. However, the Special Division was dissolved without Justice Amores submitting his manifestation, and the First Division subsequently promulgated the decision. Justice Francisco held that once the Special Division was created, the First Division was divested of jurisdiction. Furthermore, deliberations among justices in a Quezon City restaurant and the presence of a non-member justice during discussions tainted the decision-making process with irregularity and rendered the assailed decision void.
5. On the appreciation of evidence, Justice Francisco extensively discussed the expert testimony of defense witness Ramon Cuervo, Jr., a reputable real estate broker and appraiser. Cuervo’s analysis, considering the nature and potential use of the leased properties (Sta. Cruz and Pasay terminals), indicated the government received a fair rental value. He concluded the contracts were not grossly disadvantageous. Justice Francisco argued this expert testimony, which was not effectively rebutted by the prosecution, should have created reasonable doubt warranting acquittal.
6. On the lack of fair trial, his findings on the jurisdictional issues and improper consideration of evidence implied procedural defects affecting the fairness of the trial for petitioner Marcos.
In summary, Justice Francisco concurred in acquitting Jose P. Dans, Jr. but dissented from the conviction of Imelda R. Marcos based on the improper denial of Dans’ demurrer, the jurisdictional invalidity of the Sandiganbayan First Division’s decision, and the failure to properly appreciate the defense’s expert evidence which, in his view, established reasonable doubt.
