GR 118883; (January 1998) (Digest)
G.R. No. 118883 January 16, 1998
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES, CATANDUANES, Represented by VICE MAYOR NENITO AQUINO and MAYOR LYDIA T. ROMANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AUGUSTO T. ANTONIO, respondents.
FACTS
Private Respondent Augusto T. Antonio was elected barangay captain in March 1989 and subsequently elected president of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) for the Municipality of San Andres, Catanduanes. By virtue of this position, he was appointed by the President as an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan. On June 14, 1990, he tendered his resignation from the Sangguniang Bayan to the Municipal Mayor, with copies furnished to the provincial governor, the DILG, and the municipal treasurer, in view of his designation by the DILG Secretary as a temporary member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Vice Mayor Nenito F. Aquino was subsequently appointed to replace him. However, the Supreme Court later declared void the DILG Secretary’s act annulling the FABC election and, consequently, Antonio’s designation to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Upon the finality of this ruling, Antonio sought to reassume his position in the Sangguniang Bayan. The Sangguniang Bayan refused, issuing resolutions declaring he had no legal basis to resume office. The DILG Legal Counsel opined that Antonio did not relinquish his office as ABC President and ex-officio member, as his designation was merely temporary and additional. Antonio filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus. The Regional Trial Court ruled in his favor, declaring his resignation ineffective for lack of acceptance by the proper authority, ordering his reinstatement, and awarding back salaries and attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals modified this decision, deleting the award of attorney’s fees and the nullification of the Sanggunian’s resolutions, but affirming the order for payment of uncollected salaries. It held that while the resignation was incomplete due to lack of acceptance by the President (the appointing authority), Antonio could no longer reassume office as his term had expired due to the May 1994 barangay elections. The petitioner Sangguniang Bayan appealed.
ISSUE
1. Whether private respondent’s resignation as ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan was complete and effective.
2. Whether private respondent had abandoned his ex-officio membership in the Sangguniang Bayan.
3. Whether private respondent is entitled to collect salaries from the Sangguniang Bayan.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the Court of Appeals.
1. On the Validity of Resignation: The Court ruled that for a resignation to be complete and operative, there must be (a) an intention to relinquish the office, (b) an act of relinquishment, and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. Acceptance is indispensable. The appointing authority is the President of the Philippines. While the DILG Secretary is the President’s alter ego, there was no evidence that the Secretary received or accepted the resignation. The act of designating Antonio to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was not an acceptance of his resignation from the Sangguniang Bayan. Therefore, his resignation was not complete and effective.
2. On Abandonment of Office: The Court held that although the resignation was ineffective, Antonio was deemed to have voluntarily abandoned his office as ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control. The intent may be inferred from his conduct. By resigning, accepting a new designation, and physically vacating the office for nearly two years without performing any duties or claiming compensation for it, Antonio clearly demonstrated an intention to abandon the office. Abandonment does not require formal acceptance by any authority. His subsequent attempt to reclaim the office after his designation was voided did not negate the prior abandonment.
3. On Entitlement to Salaries: Since Antonio had voluntarily abandoned his office, he was not entitled to the payment of salaries for the period he did not serve. A public official is only entitled to compensation if he renders service. The principle of “no work, no pay” applies.
The Supreme Court concluded that while Antonio’s resignation was incomplete, he voluntarily abandoned his position. Consequently, the payment of back salaries ordered by the lower courts was set aside.
