GR L 5984 5; (January, 1954) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-5984 and L-5985; January 28, 1954
FRANCISCO SEGOVIA, petitioner, vs. PRISCILLA GARCIA, ROSARIO GARCIA, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents; FRANCISCO SEGOVIA, petitioner, vs. SIMPLICIA VILLAPANDO and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS
In G.R. No. L-5984, respondents Priscila Garcia and Rosario Garcia inherited a parcel of land in Unisan, Quezon, from their father Antero Garcia, who had obtained a Homestead Patent (No. 8840) and Original Certificate of Title (No. 1279) in 1926 and 1927, respectively. On June 19, 1944, they sold this land to petitioner Francisco Segovia for P10,000 in Japanese occupation currency, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19396 was issued to Segovia on June 23, 1944.
In G.R. No. L-5985, respondent Simplicia Villapando is the widow of Angel F. Villegas, who owned a homestead in Unisan, Quezon, for which he was issued Homestead Patent No. 24518 and Original Certificate of Title No. 4090 in 1933. On June 19, 1944, Villegas sold the homestead to petitioner Segovia for P10,000 in occupation money, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19384 was issued to Segovia on June 23, 1944.
After liberation, the respondents sought to repurchase the lands from Segovia. The Court of Appeals held that Segovia could not refuse the repurchase under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 . Segovia appealed via certiorari.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the respondents, as heirs/widow of the original homestead patentees, have the right to repurchase the homestead lands under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (formerly Section 117 of Act No. 2874 ), specifically interpreting the term “applicant” in the law.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the term “applicant” in Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (and its predecessor, Section 117 of Act No. 2874 ) must be interpreted to mean the holder of a patent (the patentee), not merely one who has applied for but not yet received a patent. This interpretation is necessary because, under the law, a conveyance is only proper after the expiration of five years from the issuance of the patent, and only a patentee can make such a conveyance and thus have the right to repurchase. The law’s intent is to protect the homesteader and family by giving them a chance to preserve the land granted by the state.
The Court distinguished the case from Isaac, et al. vs. Tan Chuan Leong, et al., as the patents here were issued in 1926/1927 and 1933, when Act No. 2874 (containing the repurchase provision) was already in force, so no vested right was impaired.
Regarding the repurchase price, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ application of the Ballantyne scale to convert the occupation currency purchase price into Philippine currency, as the repurchase could have been effected before liberation using occupation currency.
The decisions were affirmed, with costs against petitioner Segovia.