GR L 6334 46; (February, 1954) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-6334 and L-6346; February 25, 1954
SEBASTIAN C. PALANCA, petitioner, vs. POTENCIANO PECSON, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
FACTS
In Special Proceedings No. 12126 (testate proceedings for the will of Carlos Palanca y Tanguinlay), Rafael Dinglasan was the attorney for Sebastian Palanca, an heir and oppositor. Due to differences, Palanca dispensed with Dinglasan’s services, and Dinglasan withdrew as counsel after the case was appealed to the Supreme Court. On July 7, 1952, Dinglasan filed a notice of attorney’s lien in the testate proceedings, claiming his services from September 1950 to March 1952 were reasonably worth at least P20,000, that Palanca had paid only P3,083, leaving a balance of P16,917, and praying the lien be entered on the record against any property or money adjudged to Palanca. Judge Potenciano Pecson ordered the notice attached to the record. On July 9, 1952, Dinglasan filed a petition in the same proceedings to fix his fees at not less than P20,000 and enforce the unpaid balance as a lien. Palanca’s motions to dismiss and for reconsideration were denied. Palanca assailed these actions via certiorari (G.R. No. L-6334). Separately, on July 10, 1952, Palanca filed in the intestate proceedings a petition for an advance inheritance of P2,000. Judge Pecson suspended action on this petition until Dinglasan’s fee petition was finally disposed of. After denial of his motion for reconsideration, Palanca filed a petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-6346) to compel Judge Pecson to act on his petition for advance inheritance.
ISSUE
1. Whether the notice of attorney’s lien may be allowed at the stage when it was filed, i.e., before a final judgment in favor of the client was secured by the attorney.
2. Whether the respondent Judge acted properly in entertaining the petition to determine attorney’s fees and in holding in abeyance Palanca’s petition for advance inheritance.
RULING
1. Yes. Under Section 33, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, an attorney may cause a statement of his lien to be registered even before the rendition of any judgment. The purpose of the recording is to establish the right to the lien, distinct from its enforcement, which may only occur after a judgment is secured in favor of the client. The provision permits registration even if the lawyer does not finish the case, as an attorney who quits or is dismissed before conclusion is equally entitled to the rule’s protection. This interpretation is supported by Section 24 of Rule 127 (as amended by Republic Act No. 636 ), which grants an attorney a lien upon all money judgments and executions in the cases where his services were retained, without requiring that the judgment must have been secured by that attorney.
2. Yes. The respondent Judge neither acted without jurisdiction nor abused his discretion. A probate court can properly pass upon a petition to determine attorney’s fees to avoid multiplicity of suits, especially when, as here, the court is already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer’s services. The filing of a lien does not legally ascertain the amount; the attorney must allege and prove the claimed amount is reasonable and unpaid, and the client has the right to be heard. The application to fix fees can be made before the court that rendered the judgment or in a separate action. Consequently, the suspension of action on the petition for advance inheritance until the attorney’s fee issue is resolved was proper.
The petitions for certiorari (G.R. No. L-6334) and mandamus (G.R. No. L-6346) are dismissed.
