GR 126337; (February, 1998) (Digest)
G.R. No. 126337 February 12, 1998
FELIX P. UY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and ARTURO T. MILLANA, respondents.
FACTS
On September 27, 1982, petitioner Felix P. Uy was promoted to Supervising Mechanical Engineer, Equipment Pool Division, Provincial Engineering Office (PEO) of Agusan del Sur. On February 26, 1988, Governor Ceferino Paredes issued Administrative Order No. 88-01 scaling down the PEO’s operations, affecting 62 employees including petitioner. Petitioner received a notice of termination effective May 16, 1988. Private respondent Arturo T. Millana, who held the position of Mechanical Engineer (two steps below petitioner), was retained. Petitioner and 61 other dismissed employees filed a complaint before the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) assailing their termination. While the petition was pending, Governor Paredes reorganized the Equipment Pool Division into the Motor Pool Division, abolished the position of Supervising Mechanical Engineer, upgraded the next ranking position (Senior Mechanical Engineer) to Chief of Division, and appointed Millana to that position. On July 1, 1989, Republic Act 6758 (Salary Standardization Law) took effect, reclassifying positions: Chief, Motor Pool Division as Head Mechanical Engineer/Engineer IV; Supervising Mechanical Engineer as Engineer III; and Senior Mechanical Engineer as Engineer II. Millana, as Chief, was designated Head Mechanical Engineer/Engineer IV. On January 29, 1993, the MSPB declared petitioner’s termination illegal and ordered his reinstatement. On August 27, 1993, Governor Democrito Plaza reinstated petitioner as Engineer IV in the Motor Pool Division and revoked Millana’s appointment. Millana appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On March 21, 1995, the CSC granted Millana’s appeal, directing his reinstatement as Engineer IV with back salaries and benefits, and ordering that petitioner Uy be reinstated to a position comparable to what he held at the time of his illegal termination. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, which denied it for lack of merit on July 10, 1996. Petitioner’s counsel received the decision on July 17, 1996, filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration on July 26, 1996, and filed the motion for reconsideration on August 20, 1996. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for extension and the motion for reconsideration, declaring its decision final and executory.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time, rendering its decision final and executory, and whether it correctly upheld the CSC’s ruling that petitioner may not be reinstated to the position of Engineer IV at the expense of Millana.
RULING
The Supreme Court found for the respondents. The failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period renders the decision final and executory. Petitioner’s counsel received the Court of Appeals’ decision on July 17, 1996; thus, the motion for reconsideration should have been filed by August 1, 1996. The filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration on July 26, 1996, and the motion for reconsideration on August 20, 1996, was a procedural lapse fatal to his cause. The Interim Rules of the Court of Appeals provide that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court of Appeals correctly denied the motions. The filing of the motion for extension did not toll the reglementary period, rendering the assailed decision final and beyond appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with lower courts and the Court of Appeals. Counsel’s failure to observe this rule, despite it being established jurisprudence for ten years since Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japson, binds the client. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals had become final and executory.