G.R. No. L-6967 May 28, 1954
JOSE PONCE DE LEON, petitioner, vs. JUDGE FIDEL IBAÑEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and SANTIAGO SYJUCO, INC., respondents.

FACTS

On April 15, 1952, the Supreme Court rendered a judgment in G.R. No. L-3316, ordering that if the judgment amount (principal and interest) was not paid within ninety (90) days from the date the judgment became final, the mortgaged properties should be sold at public auction. However, the execution of this judgment was ordered to be held in abeyance until after the moratorium orders (Republic Act No. 342 and related executive orders) were lifted. The moratorium was lifted on June 9, 1953, pursuant to the decision in Rutter vs. Esteban. On July 7, 1953, respondent Santiago Syjuco, Inc. filed a motion for execution. The Court of First Instance of Manila granted the motion on July 22, 1953, and issued a writ of execution on July 24, 1953. The court’s order reasoned that the 90-day period started to run on April 16, 1952 (the day after the entry of judgment declaring it final), and had already elapsed; the moratorium did not prohibit payment, so execution could immediately issue upon the moratorium’s lifting. Petitioner Jose Ponce de Leon filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed this petition for certiorari, arguing that the execution order deprived him of the 90-day period to pay the judgment as provided by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, since the moratorium was lifted only on June 9, 1953.

ISSUE

Whether the order of execution issued by the respondent court is valid, considering it did not grant the mortgage debtor a new 90-day period to pay the judgment after the lifting of the moratorium.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and declared the orders of execution null and void. The Court held that the 90-day period granted to a mortgage debtor under Section 2 of Rule 70 to pay the judgment is a substantive right, not merely procedural. It is a crucial step to extinguish the mortgagor’s equity of redemption and cannot be omitted. The original Supreme Court judgment’s execution was expressly held in abeyance due to the moratorium; therefore, the 90-day period never commenced. The lifting of the moratorium did not automatically make the abeyance order effective. A new court order was necessary to revive the payment order, and this new order must grant the debtor the 90-day period required by the rules. The respondent court’s order of execution, issued without providing this 90-day period, was invalid. The Court rejected the respondent’s argument that the action was moot, as the validity of the execution order itself was being challenged. The Court, in the interest of speedy justice, ordered the petitioner to pay the judgment within ninety (90) days; otherwise, the mortgaged property would be sold. The decision’s penultimate paragraph was amended by a Resolution on June 29, 1954, for clarity.